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The Future of HIPAA in the Cloud
Abstract
This white paper examines how cloud computing generates new privacy
challenges for both healthcare providers and patients, and how American
health privacy laws may be interpreted or amended to address these
challenges. Given the current implementation of Meaningful Use rules for
health information technology and the Omnibus HIPAA Rule in health
care generally, the stage is now set for a distinctive law of “health
information” to emerge. HIPAA has come of age of late, with more
aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward healthcare providers
and entities. Nevertheless, more needs to be done to assure that health
privacy and all the values it is meant to protect are actually vindicated in
an era of ever faster and more pervasive data transfer and analysis.
After describing how cloud computing is now used in healthcare, this
white paper examines nascent and emerging cloud applications. Current
regulation addresses many of these scenarios, but also leaves some
important decision points ahead. Business associate agreements between
cloud service providers and covered entities will need to address new
risks. To meaningfully consent to new uses of protected health
information, patients will need access to more sophisticated and granular
methods of monitoring data collection, analysis, and use. Policymakers
should be concerned not only about medical records, but also about
medical reputations used to deny opportunities. In order to implement
these and other recommendations, more funding for technical assistance
for health privacy regulators is essential.
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The Future of HIPAA in the Cloud
Frank Pasquale & Tara Adams Ragone 1
I.

Introduction

Corporations
are
increasingly
turning
to
cloud
computing
solutions
for storage, communication, and analytical needs. The logic of specialization is irresistible for
many. Outsource information technology (IT) to a third party, and let it worry about security,
deduplication, archiving, backup, and other critical issues.
The cloud has its dangers, to be sure—outages may be rarer, but more devastating when
they do occur, given the centralization of storage and related services. This centralization of data
also makes cloud providers a target for hackers. But the logic of efficiency and specialization is
compelling. 2 Just as Amazon effectively consolidated the business of thousands of individual
book retailers into a single platform, some futurists envision a mass migration of business
records to a small number of cloud service providers.
Whatever their merits in other areas of business, cloud models have come under scrutiny
when used in the healthcare arena. Patients are rightly concerned about critical health data being
lost or inappropriately accessed. 3 On the one hand, cloud service providers may reduce those
risks by deploying their unique expertise. On the other hand, the more entities access data, the
more chances there are for something to go wrong. Risks along many dimensions—legal,
reputational, medical, among others—need to be addressed.
This white paper examines one particular dimension of that risk: dangers to health
privacy interests caused by inappropriate data access, storage, transmission, or analysis. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) provide a general framework of
federal law to help deter and reduce the likelihood that such issues will occur; state laws often
1

Pasquale is Schering-Plough Professor in Health Care Regulation and Enforcement at Seton Hall Law School.
Ragone is Research Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Seton Hall Law School and its Center for Health &
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy. We would like to thank the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and
Microsoft Corporation for sponsoring this research. We also wish to thank Melissa Goldstein, Melissa Markey, Bill
Pewen, and Nicolas Terry for commenting on the white paper.
2
See, e.g., Michael Hugos & Derek Hulitzky, BUSINESS IN THE CLOUD: WHAT EVERY BUSINESS NEEDS TO KNOW
ABOUT CLOUD COMPUTING (2010) (describing the factors “driving business to the cloud and away from corporate
data centers,” including that “cloud computing enables clearer focus on the business,” “cloud computing reduces
dependence on internal infrastructure and the capital expense that goes with that infrastructure,” “cloud computing
automatically scales up and down with business volume, and this variable cost operating model reduces financial
risks,” “in-house systems can be migrated to the cloud with relative ease if the process is well designed,” and “cloud
computing . . . allow[s] customers to buy only what they consume”).
3
Gina Stevens, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL34120, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA BREACH
NOTIFICATION LAWS (2010); Lucas Mearian, ‘Wall of Shame’ Exposes 21M Medical Record Breaches,
COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230028.
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reinforce those patient protections. 4 After years of being dismissed as a toothless tiger, HIPAA
has come of age of late, with more aggressive enforcement efforts targeting wayward healthcare
providers, payers, and other covered entities. 5 Nevertheless, more needs to be done to assure
that health privacy and all the values it is meant to protect are actually vindicated in an era of
cloud computing, given the ever faster and more pervasive data transfer and analysis that
technological change is now bringing to the healthcare sector.
This white paper surveys some important areas in health privacy regulation and data
protection standards. After describing how cloud computing is now used in healthcare, it
examines nascent and emerging cloud applications (Part II). Current regulation addresses many
of these scenarios but also leaves some important decision points ahead (Part III). The white
paper offers some recommendations for future policy, reflecting the concerns of diverse U.S.
stakeholders and lessons from both state law and international policy (Part IV). It concludes
with some reflections on the clash of cultures between the healthcare sector and the Silicon
Valley giants now dominating the cloud (Part V).
II.

The Role of Cloud Computing in Healthcare
A.

How Cloud Computing Is Now Used in Healthcare

Virtually every healthcare provider, health plan and healthcare clearinghouse has used
information technology, if only for revenue cycle management. The diffusion of electronic health
records (EHRs) has now reached a critical mass, assuring that more healthcare entities are
dealing with digitized records of protected health information (PHI). Meaningful use regulations
soon will also move from “carrot” to “stick,” taking a bite out of Medicare reimbursements for
eligible healthcare providers who fail to get on the digitization bandwagon.
Traditionally, healthcare providers have invested in desktop computers, servers, routers,
and storage devices on site. 6 They have also licensed software, which is installed onsite. The
4

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) is Title VIII of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (2009)
(codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office for
Civil Rights (OCR) is responsible for enforcing the Privacy and Security Rules promulgated under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The Privacy Rule protects the privacy of individually
identifiable health information, while the Security Rule sets national standards for the security of electronic
protected health information. HIPAA applies to covered entities and business associates, as defined in 45 C.F.R. §
160.103.
5
See, e.g., Mary Anne Pazanowski, HHS Breaks New Ground with $43 Million Penalty for HIPAA Privacy Rule
Violation, 20 HEALTH LAW REPORTER 277 (BNA) (Feb. 24, 2011).
6
Third party EHR vendors come in many varieties. Attorney Michael J. Daray describes two general competing
models of EHR vendors. See Michael Daray, Negotiating Electronic Health Record Technology Agreements, 22
No. 2 Health Law 53 (2009). The “traditional model” involves a healthcare provider acquiring a license in EHR
software from a third party vendor. The software is then installed on the physician’s computer hardware or network,
and patient data is then stored on the physician’s premises. The advantage to this model is that the physician retains
control over the data, but cost can be a downside. Id. at 54.
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healthcare provider, as a buyer of hardware and software licensee, has had the responsibility to
coordinate these systems and to optimize their utilization and management. An on-site IT
infrastructure can be costly and hard to manage, especially in comparison to specialized cloud
service providers. Healthcare professionals have enough difficulty keeping up with the newest
medical research and applying it to their care settings; understanding the latest trends in IT (even
if deciphered and presented by a dedicated IT staff) may prove to be a task few are well-qualified
for. Further, the increasing emphasis on health IT has created a significant dearth of wellqualified health IT staff, placing such staff largely outside the grasp of smaller healthcare
providers such as physician offices. Many healthcare providers, particularly physicians, clinics,
and stand-alone hospitals, do not want the responsibility of owning and managing hardware and
software for electronic health records, practice management, and revenue cycle management.
Early steps toward the modern cloud computing paradigm offered another alternative.
The use of browser-based applications and data centers became of particular interest to
healthcare providers. As internet connectivity became more pervasive and reliable for many
commercial entities, the ability to run applications remotely became a reality. The availability of
software through hosted solutions, such as "Software as a Service" ("SaaS"), allows the
investment in hardware and hosting services to be made by the vendor, while the healthcare
provider's investment is limited to subscription payments. The users do not own hardware or
software, other than the machines used locally to access the SaaS vendor. 7 Rather, they are often
7

Generally, a cloud service provider manages information on behalf of (or regarding) another entity. There are
several different service models for storing information in the cloud. First, the EHR vendor may use the SaaS model
discussed above to allow customers to access the software on a cloud infrastructure, with the cloud provider
responsible for the software. See H. Ward Classen, Cloudy with A Chance of Rain: Avoiding Pitfalls in Cloud
Computing, 45 MD. B.J. 18, 20 (2012). Second, the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model allows customers to
access data held on the cloud through the internet with their own software. Id. Third, the Business Process as a
Service (BPaaS) model allows customers to access an entire business on the cloud, such as billing. Id. In the fourth
model, Platform as a Service (PaaS), “the cloud vendor provides all of the services provided in IAAS, but also
provides the operating system and storage and network capacity management. . . . Essentially, the customer has
outsourced to the cloud vendor full data center operations, while retaining applications-level responsibilities,
including maintenance of databases, patch administration, and similar activities.” Melissa Markey, Esq. & Margaret
Marchak, Esq., “Chapter 15: Security Considerations in Technology Contracting,” at 19 (draft chapter on file with
authors). Melissa Markey reports that Security as a Service (SecaaS) is another model that has been gaining
popularity. See Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors). SecaaS, which is a segment of the SaaS
market, permits customers to outsource security management over the internet, including services such as anti-virus
and anti-malware. See “Introduction to Security as a Service,” Cloud Security Alliance,
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/secaas/ (last visited May 20, 2013); “Definition: Security as a Service
(SaaS),” SearchSecurity, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Security-as-a-Service (last visited May 20,
2013). As Markey and Marchak point out, the different models involve varying levels of control over software and
hardware, which affects what contract terms may be appropriate to address responsibility for data security:
[T]he relative degree of control over the environment, both hardware and
software, vary significantly depending on the service model procured by the
customer. In IAAS, the cloud vendor has control of the physical environment
and hardware, and thus should be contractually obligated to implement
reasonable security controls over related risk areas. Because the customer has
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paying for access to the SaaS programs and/or for new computational capabilities, and all the
accompanying data processing and assistance that implies. 8 Use of SaaS solutions permitted
healthcare providers to invest in more technology, as the need for capital investment in hardware
decreased, thus developing richer data sets. As this model matures, moving beyond native
applications to more collaborative platforms can lead to co-creation of value (as in, say,
concurrent or shared access by both primary care and specialist physicians to a record set).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has defined cloud computing
as “a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction.” 9 If cloud computing were merely a form of IT outsourcing, it might not be worthy
of much legal note. The contractual arrangements and laws of agency surrounding such
outsourcing processes are well-established. Rather, cloud computing services involve new
innovations in both technology and business models that create new opportunities—and perils—
for healthcare providers and contractors alike. 10
Moreover, there are unique issues in the healthcare industry that can make the
implementation of cloud computing more of a challenge. 11 As A.K. Soman observes,
The Healthcare industry is however different from most other
industry verticals. Healthcare data is highly sensitive—any breach
of privacy and security in the context of healthcare data can have
serious consequences. Secondly, there are multiple entities that
have to deal with healthcare data. This includes care providers,
control over the operating system and applications, the customer must accept
greater responsibility for security with respect to those elements. The opposite
is true, however, for SAAS implementations, wherein the cloud provider should
be contractually obligated to implement reasonable security controls for the
entire environment.
Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 20.
8
In SaaS, the physician subscribes to the software that is remotely hosted on a server, and uploads patient data that
is stored on that server. Given the use of technology here, “concerns aris[e] if the vendor ceases business
operations.”
Bulletin,
American
College
of
Surgeons,
at
http://www.facs.org/fellows_info/bulletin/negotiatingehr.html. For this reason, the contract with the cloud provider
must address data back up and provide a clear right to data if the contract expires or terminates. See Markey &
Marchak, supra note 7, at 34; Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors). Data ownership and limited
rights of use clauses may also help clarify expectations in such scenarios.
9
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Cloud Computing, at http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloudcomputing/.
10
Delivery models for the cloud infrastructure itself come in four varieties: public, private, hybrid, or community.
See Classen, supra note 7, at 20-21.
11
Chris Preimesberger, Storing Health Records in the Cloud: Ten Reasons Why It’s a Bad Idea,
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Data-Storage/Storing-Health-Records-in-the-Cloud-10-Reasons-Why-Its-a-Bad-Idea290388/ (Aug. 17, 2010) (but note that the key source for the story is the founder of a client/server-based health-care
record software maker).
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hospital administration staff, payers, labs, [and] patients
themselves. There are extensive regulations governing the
healthcare industry and many of these regulations impact the
nature of the information technology solutions adopted by the
industry. The fact that cloud based solutions are being reliably
used in other industry segments does not automatically imply that
they can be used in the healthcare industry. 12
Nevertheless, cloud-based practice management software has taken on such sensitive issues as
patient account management, managing patients, HIPAA compliance, patient portals, 13 and
appointment scheduling. 14 Cloud-based ePrescription systems may also help providers meet
HIPAA’s meaningful use requirements. 15 Whether the preceding functionalities (of practice
management, revenue cycle management, or EHRs) are cloud-based or not, a healthcare provider
might choose to back up its system in the cloud using a web storage service—or its contractors
may choose to do so.
Cloud services suffer from certain vulnerabilities. For example, cloud services are at the
mercy of internet access. Prolonged internet outages, such as recently experienced during
Hurricane Sandy, create real risks that healthcare providers will not be able to access critical
information when it is most needed. 16 Privacy is also a renewed concern, as breaches of massive
databases, even if they are less likely to occur than scattered breaches, are far more menacing to
privacy and security. 17

12

A.K. Soman, CLOUD-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR HEALTHCARE IT, 84 (2011).
Such portals can include functionality to “1) Schedule new appointments or modify previously scheduled
appointments with the care provider; 2) Register or complete any forms (including medical history) online …; 3)
Send messages to physicians or ask questions, 4) Request prescription medication refills; 5) Review billing
information and make payments online; 6) Review further educational information pertaining to their condition.”
Id. at 94.
14
Id. at 92.
15
Id. at 95 (“An ePrescription system is a computerized system in which the prescription is either entered by the
physician/nurse practitioner or generated on the basis of data available to the system. The prescription can be
automatically communicated to pharmacies associated with the healthcare provider.”).
16
Compare discussion in Foley & Lardner LLP, Cloud Computing for Health Care Organizations (2012). Foley &
Lardner recommend explicitly mapping out the “mission criticality” of aspects of a cloud service before committing
to it. Id. at 5. On the other hand, “Datacenters are typically located in places where the risk of natural disasters
(such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, etc) and man-made disasters (such as riots, explosions, etc.) is minimal.
They are located in places with abundant availability of resources such as water and electricity.” SOMAN, supra note
12, at 75.
17
Designers of cloud computing services are taking this risk into account. See, e.g., Siani Pearson, Taking Account
of Privacy when Designing Cloud Computing Services § 3.1 (Hewlett Packard Labs., HPL-2009-54, 2009),
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2009/HPL-2009-54.pdf; Microsoft Private Cloud Computing; Miranda Mowbray
& Siani Pearson, A Client-Based Privacy Manager for Cloud Computing, 4 Proc. Int'l ICST Conf. on Comm. Sys.
Software & Middleware 5, § 1 (2009). Some experts note the appeal of “private cloud” computing, given these
concerns. SOMAN, supra note 12, at 77 (“The Private Cloud entails incurring the cost disadvantages associated with
in-house IT, since you have to put up the entire infrastructure for the use of your organization alone. On the other
hand the benefit of the Private Cloud is the security it offers. The Private Cloud is subject to the policies of the
13
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Cloud systems thus offer a significant number of tradeoffs. In exchange for control and
ownership, users are offered expertise. Yet it is important not to overstate the change here. In
many ways the users never really “owned” the software they operated—it was licensed. The
EHR literature abounds with worries and complaints from providers that they were “locked into”
a certain software system. If they contractually promote platform-independence and data
portability, some cloud services may help alleviate such concerns. But they also raise a whole
new set of issues.
B.

Nascent and Future Applications of Cloud Computing

Both cutting edge providers and informed patients are likely to demand more cloud
computing services (or at least connectivity and interoperability with them) in the future,
especially as self-tracking devices proliferate. 18 As the possibilities of big data analysis inform
the development of health information technology, the computational prowess of centralized and
remote IT providers becomes particularly important. 19 Several nascent and emerging
applications of computation in healthcare suggest the intensification of this trend. 20
Over a decade ago, David Eddy was using a computer model, Archimedes, to model
human drug trials. 21 The American Diabetes Association asked him to project how well a given
drug was likely to work, based on extant information in his databases and models based on past
experiences with similar compounds. Now, similar technology can be repurposed to identify
organization, just as its operation is under the organization’s control. Therefore, data really never ‘leaves’ your
premises. This addresses the key concern pertaining to (public) Cloud services, namely, control over the data.”).
18
Emily Singer, The Measured Life, MIT TECH. REV., July/Aug. 2011, available at
http://www.technologyreview.com/featured-story/424390/the-measured-life/ (“The new generation of devices rely
on inexpensive, low-power wireless transceivers that can automatically send data to the wearer’s cell phone or
computer. Compared with the limited snapshot of health that is captured during an annual visit to the doctor’s
office, these tools and techniques could reveal the measures of someone’s health in context, and with a much richer
resolution.”).
19
Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY WE
LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013) (discussing three key characteristics of the new opportunities in data: “more” data
is available, and while it’s “messier” than prior data sets, that doesn’t matter in an era when “correlations rather than
causation” are the key desiderata of analysts); see also Chris Anderson, The End of Theory, WIRED (2008), available
at http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/16-07/pb_theory (“This is a world where massive amounts
of data and applied mathematics replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out with every theory of
human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why
people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With
enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.”).
20
Of course, one should be wary of overestimating the impact of these trends. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry,
Information
Technology’s
Failure
to
Disrupt
Health
Care,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2118653 (examining “four possible explanations for the
difficulties faced by HIT in disrupting health care”).
21
Jennifer Kahn, Modeling Human Drug Trials--Without the Humans, WIRED, Dec. 2009, at 156, 157, 194,
available at http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/11/ff_archimedes/all/ (“In early 2004 . . . the American Diabetes
Association asked a physician and mathematician named David Eddy to run his own . . . trial [on atorvastatin]. He
would do it, though, without human test subjects, instead using a computer model he had designed called
Archimedes.”).
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optimal treatment approaches to particular cases. For example, there is growing excitement
about the use of advanced computing systems in clinical decision support. The partnership
between IBM and Memorial Sloan-Kettering Hospital is one of the most noted of these
developments. 22 By integrating medical records, treatment guides, public research, and private
insight, “Watson-like” technology may be able to assist physicians in assessing treatment
options. Given the appeal of new technologies to patients, and the increasing difficulty for
physicians to maintain currency in new developments and consider all of the possible diagnoses
for each patient, we are likely to see widespread demand for this type of clinical decision support
in many treatment areas.
It will also be tempting for the giants behind public and hybrid cloud computing
platforms to begin to study the correlations emerging in massive data stores. Geoffrey Miller
recently commented on the extraordinary divergence in the research capacities of academics
(who are often hamstrung by IRB requirements) and large internet companies (which face no
Researchers have already demonstrated that big data-enabled
similar hurdles). 23
pharmacovigilance might reveal problems sooner than ordinary adverse event reporting
systems. 24
Sharona Hoffman and Andy Podgurski’s article, Improving Health Care Outcomes
through Personalized Comparisons of Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health
Records, gives a taste of future applications that patients may demand to optimize their
healthcare. They have detailed how personalized programs of research on effectiveness could
work:
We propose the development of a broadly accessible framework to
enable physicians to rapidly perform, through a computerized
service, medically sound personalized comparisons of the
effectiveness of possible treatments for patients’ conditions. A
personalized comparison of treatment effectiveness . . . for a given
patient (the subject patient) would be based on data from EHRs of
a cohort of patients who are similar to the subject patient
22

Jonah Comstock, IBM’s Watson Interns at Memorial Sloan Kettering, MOBIHEALTHNEWS, available at
http://mobihealthnews.com/20255/ibms-watson-interns-at-memorial-sloan-kettering/ (“shows how Watson might
help an oncologist diagnose and treat a cancer patient”).
23
Geoffrey Miller, N=Billions: The Smartphone Revolution in the Behavioral Sciences, Berkman Center (Mar. 12,
2013), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2013/03/miller (“Smartphones will empower
behavioral scientists to collect terabytes of ecologically valid data from vast global samples – easily, quickly, and
remotely. Smartphones can record where people are, what they are doing, and what they can see and hear. They can
run interactive surveys, tests, and experiments through touch screens and Bluetooth peripherals.”).
24
Ryen White, et al., Web-scale Pharmacovigilance: Listening to Signals from the Crowd, JAMIA (Jan. 13, 2013),
available at http://jamia.bmj.com/content/early/2013/02/05/amiajnl-2012-001482.abstract
(“The results
demonstrate that logs of the search activities of populations of computer users can contribute to drug safety
surveillance.”).
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(clinically, demographically, genetically), who received the
treatments previously and whose outcomes were recorded. 25
As they explain, such a database query could identify, “for a given patient, an appropriate
reference group (cohort) of similar, previously treated patients whose EHRs would be analyzed
to choose the optimal treatment for the patient at issue.” 26 Research has already demonstrated
that pharmacogenetic algorithms can outperform algorithms that consider only clinical factors. 27
The President’s Committee Advising on Science & Technology (PCAST) has also
endorsed aggressive use of health data to ensure new research opportunities. 28 The PCAST
authors conclude that many clinical research studies today are “out of date before they are even
finished,” “burdensome and costly,” and too narrowly focused. 29 They endorse health
information technology that is enabled for “syndromic surveillance,” “public health monitoring,”
and “adverse event monitoring” by aggregating observational data. 30
Efthimios Parasidis also describes how the development of health information technology
infrastructures in the United States can enable forms of surveillance that are more rigorous,
comprehensive, and actionable in the world of policy and more user-friendly for patients. 31 As
he observes, “EHR systems now permit advanced data-entry options such as ‘free text [entry],
templated data entry, dictation, speech recognition, and freehand graphic input.’” 32 Rather than
getting between doctor and patient, advanced EHR stands poised to silently monitor and improve
their relationship. 33 The same record systems that are designed to digitize health diagnoses and
interventions can also generate outcome data if they are configured appropriately. Such data
would help ensure patients and authorities are truly informed about the risks and benefits of
drugs. 34 A complete record of “demographics, progress notes, vital signs, medical history,
immunization history, and laboratory and radiological reports” can contribute greatly to
25

Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes through Personalized Comparisons of
Treatment Effectiveness Based on Electronic Health Records, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 425 (2011).
26
Id. at 426; see also INST. OF MED., CHALLENGES FOR THE FDA: THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY 52 (2007),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11969) (calling for more targeted comparative
effectiveness research).
27
J. Woodcock and L. J. Lesko, Pharmacogenetics--Tailoring Treatment for the Outliers, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED.
811, 811 (2009).
28
President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF
HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICANS: THE PATH FORWARD 64 (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf (recommending
use of “large datasets” to address numerous issues in clinical research).
29
Id. at 63.
30
Id. at 64.
31
Efthimios Parasidis, Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the Regulation of Medical
Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 966-67 (2011).
32
Id. at 965.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 967-68.
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“evidence-based decision support, quality management, and health-outcomes reporting at both
the individual and population levels.” 35
In the realm of health information technology, Parasidis, Hoffman, and Podgurski are
among the first legal academics to convincingly merge literatures of health system
transformation, practical implementation, and legal guidance. They suggest the practical
feasibility of transforming healthcare generally, and post-market pharmaceutical surveillance in
particular, into an information industry with the types of productivity gains we usually associate
only with Silicon Valley. 36 As Parasidis notes of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) deployment of “Mini-Sentinel:”
Rather than creating a centralized database, Mini-Sentinel uses a
distributed data network that is linked by a coordinating center.
The Mini-Sentinel data network incorporates EHRs from diverse
data sets that are maintained by public and private stakeholders.
Each data partner retains control over its own patient-level data
and permits others to access its aggregated and de-identified
medical data. 37
Just as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency have
advanced domestic intelligence capabilities by querying distributed databases from diverse
public and private sector partners, the FDA now can apply such technology toward improving
population health. 38
For example, consider the deficiencies in America’s system of
pharmacovigilance -- “the science and activities relating to the detection, assessment,
understanding and prevention of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem.” 39 The
tactics and methods developed by leading information industries could be applied to the
assessment of drugs and devices, raising very difficult issues under health privacy laws.

35

Id. at 964.
See id. at 984-86 (proposing integration of post-market drug surveillance into an extant health IT infrastructure);
Hoffman & Podgurski, Improving Health Care Outcomes, supra note 25, at 425 (proposing the development of a
“broadly accessible framework” that enables doctors to quickly perform comparisons of treatments); Hoffman &
Podgurski, Finding A Cure: The Case for Regulation and Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV.
J. L & TECH. 103, 151 (2008) (recommending regulations that require doctors to use information technology to
improve practices).
37
Parasidis, supra note 31, at 971.
38
For an account of the DHS approach, see Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1441, 1449 (2011) (discussing the close ties of private entities
to state and federal “fusion centers,” which collect and share information and intelligence).
39
World Health Organization, THE IMPORTANCE OF PHARMACOVIGILANCE 7 (2002), available at
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4893e/s4893e.pdf.
36
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Observational research (based on actual patients’ experience with drugs and procedures)
may turn out to be more useful than clinical trials in many ways once a critical mass of outcomes
has been recorded and researchers can control for environmental and other variations. 40 Digitized
health data should enable extraordinary new possibilities for medical research. 41
Efthimios Parasidis’s article, Patients Over Politics, examines the implications of new
technologies for pharmacovigilance. 42 Parasidis envisions taking the type of analysis in
comparisons of treatment effectiveness to a population-wide analysis. He convincingly argues
that post-approval surveillance will only reach its full potential if a wider array of stakeholders
begins to take advantage of the emerging health data infrastructure to critically evaluate the
effects of various treatments. 43 The free flows of data elevated to constitutional status in the case
of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 44 may also eventually improve pharmacovigilance. 45 But just as
Sorrell eviscerated a Vermont patient privacy law in order to promote data flows, so future
decisions in this area may end up limiting efforts by policymakers to define and enforce the
proper restrictions on data flows. 46
Finally, there is the growing pressure from patients to develop control over medical
records for their own purposes. While HITECH split responsibility for EHRs and personal
health records (PHRs) between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the centrifugal pressure toward integrated and
comprehensive databases may not make this a sensible decision for long. While the “sharing or
exchange of data between PHRs and healthcare providers or their EHRs” was “speculative” as of
2009, 47 the interfaces between PHRs and EHRs will be tested by new applications and mobile
health (mHealth) developments. 48 For example, members of the “quantified self” movement can
40

Id. at 66-67.
President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., supra note 28, at 5 (describing potential improvements in care).
42
Parasidis, supra note 31, at 977 (proposing “reform measures that mitigate risk-enhancing aspects of the regulatory
framework for medical products”).
43
Id. at 970–74.
44
131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
45
Id. at 2670-72 (ruling that drug companies have a constitutional right to access certain types of data without undue
state interference). For a critical description of the stakes of Sorrell, see David Orentlicher, Prescription Data
Mining and the Protection of Patients’ Interests, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 74, 81 (2010) (“When people develop
relationships with their physicians and pharmacists, they are entitled to the assurance that information about their
medical condition will be used for their benefit and not to place their health at risk or to increase their health care
costs.”); Frank Pasquale, Privacy as a First Amendment Value, THE HEALTH CARE BLOG (Apr. 29, 2011),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2011/04/29/rethinking-ims-health-v-sorrell-privacy-as-a-first-amendment-value/.
46
Beverly Cohen, Regulating Data Mining Post-Sorrell: Using HIPAA to Restrict Marketing Uses of Patients'
Private Medical Information, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1148 (2012); Orentlicher, supra note 45, at 74;
Michael Heesters, An Assault on the Business of Pharmaceutical Data Mining, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789 (2009).
47
Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXEL L. REV.
216, 226 (2009).
48
Ethan Katsh, et al., Is there an App for That? Electronic Health Records and a New Environment of Conflict
Prevention and Resolution, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 34 (2011) (describing translational difficulties between
41
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track their pulse, sleep time, weight, mood, and meters walked per day, based on smartphoneenabled self-monitoring. 49 Isn’t some or all of this data (properly summarized or visualized)
something that a physician or wellness coach would want some access to? Yet providers may
not be building in the type of “privacy by design” necessary to make this type of data exchange
safe for all involved in it.
More modest forms of clinical decision support may also merge with marketing. Cashstrapped practices are also liable to want to try to buy in to “free” EHR models which are adbased. Even once HITECH subsidies are accounted for, physicians will still often treat their IT
spend as a fixed cost to be minimized. One of the most successful cloud-based email hosting
services, Gmail, capitalizes on data analyzed in its records to serve targeted ads. Some EHRs are
based on this model, and may well be aiming to synthesize multiple records (or a whole
practice’s records) to sell high-impact advertising opportunities to pharmaceutical firms, device
makers, or other entities. Given the technological flavor of much recent fraud enforcement effort
at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its various contractors, such data
may also be very useful for their purposes as well. 50
III.

Health Privacy and Data Security in a Cloud Computing Context

Cloud computing may fuel a convergence of research, treatment, and marketing
opportunities. But before it can do so, healthcare providers, health plans, and other healthcare
entities covered by HIPAA (“covered entities” or CEs) must be assured that they will be able to
abide by longstanding privacy and security obligations under HIPAA. This section explores how
aspects of HIPAA will affect both covered entities’ and patients’ views of cloud computing
options. Part A examines the role of business associate agreements (and regulation of business
associates (BAs)) in assuring accountability in a networked cloud computing environment. Part
B explores some of the issues patients are likely to raise (and face) as cloud computing becomes
more popular.

A.

HIPAA in the Cloud from a Covered Entity’s Perspective

EHRs and PHRs, and noting that “the transition from paper to digital in the healthcare field is still . . . an extremely
complex transition involving patients, doctors, and a variety of old and new stakeholders.”); Lisa Wangsness,
Electronic Health Records Raise Doubt, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2009, at C1 (describing mistake in downloading
of EHR information to a PHR).
49
Anita Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (2008) (“The
lifelog could easily store data pertaining to purely biological states derived from continuous self-monitoring of, for
example, heart rate, respiration, blood sugar, blood pressure, and arousal.”).
50
Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Address at the Stop Medicare Fraud Summit (Aug. 26,
2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/about/speeches/smfsummit.html (“Under the new law, we’re also
making it easier for law enforcement officials to see health care claims data from around the country in one place,
combining all Medicare-paid claims into a single, searchable database.”).
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Among the Omnibus HIPAA Rule provisions most significant for cloud computing are
those pertaining to liability. 51 The final rule makes clear that liability extends down the chain
well beyond covered entities to reach business associates, which include certain subcontractors. 52
While the prior HIPAA model of enforcement focused on CEs, after the HITECH Act, a
business associate is regulated directly by HIPAA, making BAs directly liable for civil monetary
penalties for their violations. 53 HIPAA also contains a breach notification rule, which binds CEs
and BAs. 54 As discussed below, a cloud service provider that creates, receives, maintains, or
transmits PHI on behalf of a covered entity comes within HIPAA’s definition of business
associate, 55 and thus it is important for cloud service providers to understand the magnitude of
these liability provisions.
1. Responsibilities of Covered Entities
Under the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, CEs remain responsible for a host of Privacy Rule and
Security Rule requirements aimed at safeguarding protected health information. 56 For example,
the Privacy Rule requires a CE, among other things, to adopt written privacy policies and
procedures; designate a privacy official to implement these policies and procedures; and train its

51

The recent Omnibus HIPAA Rule is designed to “strengthen the privacy and security protections established
under [HIPAA] for individual’s health information maintained in electronic health records and other formats.”
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach-Notification Rules Under the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act;
Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules; Final Rule,” 78 Fed. Reg. 5566, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Final
Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, 78 Fed. Reg at X]. In addition, the rule intends to “increase flexibility for and
decrease burden on the regulated entities.” Id.
52
The HIPAA Privacy Rule regulates covered entities' use and disclosure of protected health information. The
covered entities regulated by HIPAA include most health plans, healthcare providers, and health care
clearinghouses. The term “health care provider” is defined by the Rule as “a provider of services . . . , a provider of
medical or health services . . . , and any other person or organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in
the normal course of business.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. Under HIPAA, any time a covered entity uses or discloses
protected health information, the use or disclosure must comply with HIPAA's privacy provisions. The term “use” is
broadly defined as “the sharing, employment, application, utilization, examination, or analysis” of health
information protected by HIPAA. Id. “Disclosure” is also broadly defined as “the release, transfer, provision of,
access to, or divulging in any other manner of information outside the entity holding the information.” Id.
53
42 U.S.C. § 17931 (“In the case of a business associate that violates any security provision . . . [the civil monetary
penalties rules] shall apply to the business associate with respect to such violation in the same manner such sections
apply to a covered entity that violates such security provision.”); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.402.
54
After HITECH, any BA or “third party servicer,” upon discovery of a breach, must notify the CE within a
reasonable time (not to exceed 60 days). 42 U.S.C. § 17932(b), (d)(1) (2012). The CE, then, must notify the patient
of the breach within a reasonable time (not to exceed 60 days). 42 U.S.C. § 17932(a), (d)(1) (2012). Moreover, if
the data breach affects more than 500 people, the CE also must notify HHS and the media. 42 U.S.C. § 17932(e)(2),
(3). The responsibilities of the parties with respect to notification should be outlined and described in the agreement
between the CE and the cloud servicer. Foley & Lardner, supra note 16, at 13-14 (“Beyond establishing the
procedural requirements and timeframes for reporting to the customer, the agreement should set forth the procedures
and role of the parties with respect to investigation of the breach and notification of individuals.”). See also 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.400414 (HIPAA breach notification rules).
55
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
56
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule defines protected health information in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
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workforce with respect to these policies. 57 The Security Rule requires a CE “to maintain
reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to prevent
intentional or unintentional use or disclosure of protected health information in violation of the
Privacy Rule and to limit its incidental use and disclosure pursuant to otherwise permitted or
required use or disclosure.” 58 Among the Security Rules requirements is an obligation for CEs
to “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information held by the
covered entity . . . .” 59 CEs are permitted to disclose PHI to a BA “if the covered entity obtains
satisfactory assurance that the business associate will appropriately safeguard the information,”
although they are not required, however, to obtain satisfactory assurances from a BA that is a
subcontractor. 60 In the event of a breach of unsecured PHI, a CE is responsible for making the
notifications to individuals, the media, and the Secretary, as applicable, as set forth in Subpart D
of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule. 61
If a CE fails to comply with an administrative simplification provision, it is directly liable
for civil, and in some cases criminal, penalties, as discussed in Section 3(A)(iii), below. 62 The
Omnibus HIPAA Rule eliminated an affirmative defense that had allowed a covered entity to
avoid a penalty if it “did not know and with the exercise of reasonable diligence would not have
known of the violation (since such violations are now punishable under the lowest tier of
penalties).” 63 It also eliminated an exception to liability “for the acts of its agent in cases where
the agent is a business associate, the relevant contract requirements have been met, the covered
entity did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in violation of the contract,
and the covered entity did not fail to act as required by the Privacy or Security Rule with respect
to such violations.” 64 In addition, a CE “must mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful
effect it learns was caused by use or disclosure of protected health information by its workforce
or its business associates in violation of its privacy policies and procedures or the Privacy
Rule.” 65 But as long as a violation occurring after February 18, 2009 is not due to willful neglect

57

See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520, 164.530(a)(1), (b); Alden J. Bianchi et al., Mintz Levin, Advisory: The New HIPAA
Omnibus Rule & Your Liability (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2013/Advisories/2663-0213NAT-HL/index.html.
58
Bianchi et al., supra note 58; see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (Security Rule).
59
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A); see also Bianchi et al., supra note 58.
60
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i).
61
See id. §§ 164.400-414.
62
Id. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5589.
63
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5585; see also James Swann, BNA Health
IT Law & Industry Report, Final HIPAA Enforcement Rule Includes Increased Civil Money Penalty Structure (Jan.
21, 2013).
64
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed Reg at 5580; James Swann, supra note 63.
65
Bianchi et al., supra note 57.
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and the CE corrects it within thirty days, HHS may not impose a civil monetary penalty on the
CE. 66
2. Provisions Allocating Responsibility and Liability to Business Associates
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule has long required CEs to have contracts or other arrangements
with BAs “to ensure that the business associates safeguard protected health information, and use
and disclose the information only as permitted or required by the Privacy Rule.” 67 The Security
Rule similarly has required CEs to “have contracts or other arrangements in place with their
business associates that provide satisfactory assurances that the business associates will
appropriately safeguard the electronic protected health information they create, receive,
maintain, or transmit on behalf of the covered entities.” 68 Prior to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, if
BAs violated these requirements, CEs could seek damages for breach of the business associate
agreement (BAA), but BAs were not subject to penalties from HHS if they violated HIPAA. 69
As required by HITECH, the Omnibus HIPAA Rule makes BAs directly liable for
compliance with certain of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules. 70 A BA will be directly
liable, for example, for any uses or disclosures of PHI that violate the Privacy Rule or the terms
of its BAA. 71 BAs also are required to provide notification to the CE in the event of a breach of
unsecured PHI; to comply with the minimum necessary rule; to cooperate with the Secretary
during complaint investigations and compliance reviews; to provide an accounting of disclosures
of PHI; and to make an electronic copy of PHI available to an individual or CE when an
individual requests it. 72
BAs also must comply with all facets of the Security Rule, which Joy Pritts, chief privacy
officer at the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, has called “the most significant
66

See 45 C.F.R. § 160.410(c); James Swann, supra note 63.
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5567.
68
Id.
69
See Robert Belfort et al., Bloomberg BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Reshapes
Landscape for Health Care Privacy, Security Compliance (Jan. 28, 2013), available at
http://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/Content/4_News_and_Events/Newsletters/HealthLaw@Manatt/BNA%20Art
icle_HIPAA%20Omnibus%20Rule.pdf.
70
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(b); see also Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566,
5568.
71
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5568; Carlos
Leyva, HIPAA Omnibus Rule Summary (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.hipaasurvivalguide.com/hipaa-omnibus-rule.php.
72
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.310(b), 164.410, 164.502(a)(4)(ii), (b),164.528; Bianchi et al., supra note 57; Belfort et al.,
supra note 69; Leyva, supra note 71. BAs are not subject to all Privacy Rule requirements. For example, they are
not required to provide notice of privacy practices or to designate a privacy official, unless required by the
applicable BAA. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.520, 164.530(a)(1)(i); Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation,
ADVISORY: New HIPAA Omnibus Rule: Issues for Employer Plan Sponsors and Group Health Plans (Mar. 11,
2013),
http://www.alston.com/Files/Publication/19c1650b-c278-4abf-9c1b9fff28d27c4a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7ed0617b-c6b1-4350-8e38-a5295c262cd1/13-195-HIPPAOmnibus-Rule.pdf.
67
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security provision in the massive new Omnibus HIPAA Rule.” 73 Thus, BAs are responsible for
completing a risk analysis and complying with HIPAA’s administrative, physical, and technical
safeguard provisions, among other requirements. 74
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also revised the definition of BAs to expressly include
particular entities, including many cloud service providers. First, it expressly includes “[a]
Health Information Organization, E-prescribing Gateway, or other person that provides data
transmission services with respect to protected health information to a covered entity and that
requires access on a routine basis to such protected health information.” 75 Citing the evolving
nature of what organizations will qualify as health information organizations, HHS declined to
define this term, but it indicated its intention to publish additional guidance. 76
HHS did, however, provide guidance in the preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule as to
what it means to have access on a routine basis to PHI. This fact-specific determination looks to
“the nature of the services provided and the extent to which the entity needs access to protected
health information to perform the service for the covered entity.” 77 While mere conduits of PHI
do not satisfy this requirement, HHS emphasized that the conduit exception is narrow and
“intended to exclude only those entities providing mere courier services, such as the U.S. Postal
Service or United Parcel Service and their electronic equivalents, such as internet service
providers (ISPs), providing mere data transmission services.” 78 Mere transmission includes
“temporary storage of transmitted data incident to such transmission.” 79 Conduits transport PHI
but “do not access it other than on a random or infrequent basis as necessary to perform the
transportation service or as required by other law.” 80 But an entity that requires access to PHI to
perform a service for a covered entity – “such as a Health Information Organization that
manages the exchange of [PHI] through a network on behalf of covered entities through the use

73

Howard Anderson, The Security Highlight of HIPAA Omnibus Shining a Spotlight on Business Associates (Mar. 1,
2013), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/security-highlight-hipaa-omnibus-p-1431.
74
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302-318 (Security Rule); Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation, supra note 72.
75
45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. The Rule
defines “person” to mean “a natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional association or
corporation, or other entity, public of private.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
76
See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571. As discussed in the text below,
while the old rule had no mention of a company that merely stored data, leading to much industry confusion, the
Omnibus HIPAA Rule states a BA is a person who, on behalf of a CE: “creates, receives, maintains, or transmits
protected health information for a function or activity regulated by this subchapter.” Id. at 5688. HHS makes clear
that “an entity that maintains protected health information on behalf of a covered entity is a business associate and
not a conduit, even if the entity does not actually view the protected health information.” Id. at 5571.
77
Id.
78
See id.
79
See id.
80
See id. at 5572.
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of record locator services for its participants” -- is not a mere conduit and instead is a business
associate. 81
Entities need not access PHI, however, to be deemed business associates. Rather, an
entity that maintains, as distinguished from an entity that merely transmits, PHI on behalf of a
covered entity is a business associate, even if the entity does not access the PHI. For example, “a
data storage company that has access to protected health information (whether digital or hard
copy) qualifies as a business associate, even if the entity does not view the information or only
does so on a random or infrequent basis.” 82 HHS explained that although conduits and entities
that maintain PHI both have the opportunity to access PHI, “the difference between the two
situations is the transient versus persistent nature of that opportunity.” To reflect this distinction,
HHS amended the definition of business associate to include creating, receiving, maintaining, or
transmitting PHI on behalf of a covered entity. 83
At a recent conference, David Holtzman of HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
indicated that cloud service providers are BAs if among their functions performed on behalf of
CEs is to maintain PHI, even if the contract does not “‘contemplate any access or access only on
a random or incidental basis,’” because “[t]he test is persistence of custody, not the degree – if
any – of access.” 84 Yet he also reportedly acknowledged a potential qualification to this rule
related to encryption. According to Holtzman, OCR has not yet determined whether HIPAA will
bind an entity that maintains encrypted data for a CE but does not have the key to access that
data. 85 It is crucial for OCR to clarify its position on this issue, given that it is not uncommon for
cloud service providers to maintain encrypted PHI without the key.
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule also makes plain that “[a] person that offers a personal health
record to one or more individuals on behalf of a covered entity” also is a business associate for
purposes of HIPAA obligations and liability. 86 Not all personal health record vendors are
business associates, however, and HHS expects to issue future guidance on this issue. 87 Whether
a vendor offers personal health records on behalf of a covered entity is a fact-sensitive inquiry. 88
HHS opined that it is insufficient for a vendor and covered entity to enter “an interoperability
relationship” by, for example, establishing the electronic means (i.e., an interface) for a covered
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See id.
See id.
83
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572.
84
Kendra Casey Plank, Cloud Providers Often Are Business Associates under HIPAA, Officials Say, 22 HEALTH
LAW REPORTER 858 (BNA) (June 6, 2013) (quoting Holtzman at “Safeguarding Health Information: Building
Assurance through HIPAA Security,” a conference sponsored by OCR and the National Institute for Standards and
Technology on May 21-22, 2013).
85
See id.
86
45 C.F.R. § 160.103; Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5571.
87
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572.
88
Id.
82
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entity’s electronic health record to send PHI to the vendor. 89 Even where an individual has given
written authorization to share data, and the covered entity and vendor have agreed on details
regarding data sharing, such as technical specifications for the exchange of data and the need for
confidentiality, the vendor is not necessarily offering the record on behalf of the covered entity. 90
But a vendor hired by and given access to PHI by a covered entity to permit the vendor “to
provide and manage a personal health record service” for the covered entity’s patients or
enrollees is a business associate. 91 Where a vendor offers personal health records both directly
to individuals and on behalf of covered entities, the vendor is deemed a business associate only
in the latter capacity. 92 HHS explained that the conduit exception does not apply to a vendor
offering a personal health record to an individual on behalf of a covered entity because such a
vendor is maintaining PHI and not serving as a mere conduit. 93 Consistent with its treatment of
data storage companies, such a vendor is a business associate if it has the ability to access PHI,
even if it does not exercise this ability. 94
The Rule also defines business associates to include “a subcontractor that creates,
receives, maintains, or transmits protected health information on behalf of the business
associate.” 95 Subcontractor, in turn, “means a person to whom a business associate delegates a
function, activity, or service, other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce 96 of such
business associate.” 97 HHS explains that the function, activity, or service delegated to the
subcontractor is one the business associate agreed to perform for a covered entity or another
business associate. 98
Determining if a subcontractor is acting on behalf of a business associate is the same
analysis that applies to whether a business associate is acting on behalf of a covered entity. 99 For
example, if a business associate third party administrator hires a company to perform document
and media shredding and disposal of PHI, this shredding company would be directly responsible
for complying with applicable HIPAA Security and Privacy Rules. 100 Similarly, a subcontractor
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Id.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
96
“Workforce means employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose conduct, in the performance of work
for a covered entity or business associate, is under the direct control of such covered entity or business associate,
whether or not they are paid by the covered entity or business associate.” Id.
97
Id.
98
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573.
99
Id. at 5572.
100
Id. at 5573. But if a business associate hires a subcontractor to shred documents that do not contain PHI, then the
subcontractor is not a business associate. See id. at 5574.
90
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hired to support a business associate with personal health record functions is a business associate
and thus required to comply with HIPAA’s breach notification rule. 101
This subcontractor revision aims to prevent covered entities and business associates from
avoiding liability for HIPAA privacy and security violations by subcontracting functions. 102
“[D]ownstream entities that work at the direction of or on behalf of a business associate and
handle protected health information would also be required to comply with the applicable
Privacy and Security Rule provisions in the same manner as the primary business associate, and
likewise would incur liability for acts of noncompliance.” 103 Thus, just as CEs must obtain
satisfactory assurances from their BAs,
business associates must do the same with regard to subcontractors
[that satisfy the Omnibus HIPAA Rule’s definition], and so on, no
matter how far ‘down the chain’ the information flows. This
ensures that individuals’ health information remains protected by
all parties that create, receive, maintain, or transmit the information
in order for a covered entity to perform its healthcare functions. 104
Carlos Leyva, an internet attorney and frequent contributor to hipaasurvivalguide.com, has
flagged the “downstream impact’ of this modification” as very significant. 105
Importantly, covered entities are not required to contract directly with subcontractors to
establish a chain of liability. 106 Instead, business associates are responsible for obtaining
satisfactory assurances in the form of a written contract or other arrangement that a subcontractor
will appropriately safeguard PHI. 107 But HHS intended liability to attach to a subcontractor,
even if the business associate failed to enter a business associate contract with the subcontractor,
as long as the party is an agent of, or other person acting on behalf of, the business associate, as
discussed in Section III.A.3 below. 108
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Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572. HHS emphasized that despite
extending the definition of business associate to include subcontractors, financial institutions that are performing
payment processing activities under Section 1179 of HIPAA continue to be excluded from the definition of business
associates. See id.
102
Id. at 5572-73.
103
Id. at 5573.
104
Id. at 5574.
105
Leyva, supra note 71.
106
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308(b)(1) and 164.502(e)(e)(i); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78
Fed. Reg. at 5573.
107
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2); HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5573.
108
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5572; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (“A
person/entity ("Person") becomes a Business Associate by definition, and NOT because there happens to be a
Business Associate contract in place; therefore liability attaches immediately when a Person "creates, receives,
maintains, or transmits Protected Health Information on behalf of a Covered Entity.”) (emphasis in original).
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This expansion of HIPAA’s reach makes business associates, including subcontractors
who satisfy HIPAA’s definition of BAs, directly liable for civil monetary, and in some cases
criminal, penalties for violations of applicable HIPAA rules. 109
3. Agency Liability of Covered Entities and Business Associates
In addition to being liable for their own HIPAA violations, covered entities and business
associates also can be liable for civil monetary penalties for their agents’ violations. 110 Under
the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, a CE or BA “is liable, in accordance with the Federal common law of
agency, for a civil money penalty for a violation based on the act or omission of any agent of the
covered entity [or business associate] . . . acting within the scope of the agency.” 111 Agents of
CEs may include a workforce member or business associate, whereas agents of BAs may include
a workforce member or a subcontractor. 112 HHS intended this revision “to ensure, where a
covered entity or business associate has delegated out an obligation under the HIPAA Rules, that
a covered entity or business associate would remain liable for penalties for the failure of its
business associate agent to perform the obligation on the covered entity or business associate’s
behalf,” even if a compliant business associate agreement is in place. 113
In adopting this revision, HHS expressed its view that liability for agency violations
would not unduly burden CEs or BAs, finding that liability for agents is customary under the
common law. 114 Despite describing agency liability as customary, HHS offered additional
guidance on when a BA will be deemed an agent. This fact-specific inquiry considers the terms
of the BAA and the totality of the circumstances involved in the relationship between the
parties. 115 Importantly, HHS rejected comments suggesting that parties could avoid these factintensive inquiries by determining agency in their contracts. Using terms, statements, or labels
such as independent contractor to refer to a party in the contract will not control the agency
analysis. 116
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See 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5589.
45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c); Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580.
111
45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2). HHS omitted from Section 160.402 the prior exception to agency liability “for
covered entity liability for the acts of its agent in cases where the agent is a business associate, the relevant contract
requirements have been met, the covered entity did not know of a pattern or practice of the business associate in
violation of the contract, and the covered entity did not fail to act as required by the Privacy or Security Rule with
respect to such violations.” Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580.
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45 C.F.R. § 160.402(c)(1)-(2).
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Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5580.
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Id. at 5581.
115
Id.
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Id.; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (“Covered Entities and Business Associates are liable for the acts of their
Business Associate agents. Comment: the Federal Common Law of Agency is controlling AND Covered Entities
and Business Associates need to pay close attention to the amount of control they exercise over a third party with
which they have a Business Associate contract. What the parties call each other is not dispositive; exercise of control
is key.”) (emphasis in original).
110

SETON HALL LAW

II 21

Rather, the focus of the agency analysis is whether the covered entity, or business
associate, in the context of business associate-subcontractor relationships, has “the right or
authority . . . to control the business associate’s conduct in the course of performing a service on
behalf of the covered entity [or business associate].” 117 An example of the type of control that
distinguishes agency from non-agency relationships is when a covered entity or business
associate has authority to give interim instructions or directions during the course of the
relationship. But agency generally will not exist where a BAA “sets terms and conditions that
create contractual obligations between the two parties.” 118 As HHS explained, “if the only
avenue of control is for a covered entity to amend the terms of the agreement or sue for breach of
contract, this generally indicates that a business associate is not acting as an agent.” 119 Thus,
where a covered entity delegates or contracts out performance of a specific HIPAA obligation,
whether the business associate is an agent of the CE will “depend on the right or authority to
control the business associate’s conduct in the performance of the delegated service based on the
right of a covered entity to give interim instructions.” 120
HHS also identified several factors to consider in determining the scope of agency: (1)
the time, place, and purpose of a business associate’s conduct; (2) whether a business associate’s
agent engaged in a course of conduct subject to a covered entity’s control; (3) whether a business
associate agent’s conduct is commonly done by a business associate to accomplish the service
performed on behalf of a covered entity; and (4) whether or not the covered entity reasonably
expected that a business associate agent would engage in the conduct in question. 121
In rejecting a commentator’s suggestion that there would be no agency liability when a
BA breaches the BAA, HHS explained that just because a BA deviates from the terms of a BAA
does not mean that the BA is operating outside of the scope of agency. 122 As a general rule, a
BA agent’s conduct is within the scope of agency when it “occurs during the performance of the
assigned work or incident to such work, regardless of whether the work was done carelessly, a
mistake was made in the performance, or the business associate disregarded a covered entity’s
specific instruction.” 123 But a BA generally acts outside of the scope of agency when its conduct
“is solely for its own benefit (or that of a third party)” or the conduct is “not intended to serve
any purpose of the covered entity.” 124
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Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5581.
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Id.
120
Id.
121
See id.
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Id. at 5582.
123
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An important consideration in determining if the BA is an agent is the type of service and
skill level required to perform the service. 125 For example, HHS opined that it is unlikely that a
business associate hired by a small provider to de-identify PHI would be deemed its agent since
it is unlikely the covered entity has the requisite expertise with this particular service to give
interim instructions to the BA. 126 A business associate hired to perform services that a covered
entity is legally or otherwise prohibited from performing, such as accreditation, is unlikely to be
deemed to be an agent of that covered entity. 127 But a covered entity does not need to retain the
right or authority to control every aspect of a BA’s activities for the BA to be an agent. 128
Further, a BA can be an agent even if the CE does not exercise its right of control as long as
there is evidence that it has the authority to do so. 129 HHS further made clear that agency can be
found even where CEs and BAs are geographically dispersed, including if they are in different
countries. 130
Carlos Leyva recently noted that although “Business Associates and Covered Entities
should clearly recognize that we are definitely ‘not in Kansas anymore,’” he does not believe the
healthcare industry has fully realized the implications of these changes. 131 As some have
observed, agency liability “significantly impacts the relationship of covered entities and their
business associates, potentially requiring greater monitoring by the covered entity when the
business associate is an agent.” 132 CEs and BAs have to wrestle with these fact sensitive issues
so they can assess the risks of liability from different relationships. They also need to engage in
ongoing risk assessment before and during contractual relationships to monitor compliance by
downstream actors. OCR is responsible for enforcing the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, and
OCR Director Leon Rodriguez recently commented that “"[o]ne of the most consistent findings
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Id. at 5581.
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Id. at 5581-82.
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Id.
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Leyva, supra note 71; see generally Proskauer, HHS Issues HIPAA/HITECH Omnibus Final Rule Ushering in
Significant
Changes
to
Existing
Regulations:
Client
Alert
(Jan.
29,
2013),
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/hhs-issues-hipaa-hitech-omnibus-final-rule-ushering-insignificant-changes-to-existing-regulations/ (“Business associates, including Health Information Organizations, Eprescribing Gateways, entities that provide data transmission services for PHI and require routine access to such
PHI, and personal health record vendors will have additional work to do as well, including: drafting and adopting
policies, procedures and related documents if they do not have them in place already; performing and documenting
risk assessments if they have not done so; and reviewing their relationships with subcontractors and entering into
business associate agreements with them as necessary.”).
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Rebecca L. Williams et al., DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP, Advisories: New Omnibus Rule Released: HIPAA
Puts on More Weight (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.dwt.com/New-Omnibus-Rule-Released-HIPAA-Puts-on-MoreWeight-01-23-2013/.
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[OCR is seeing] is failure to conduct risk assessments of where protected health information is
vulnerable.’" 133
CEs and BAs have a great deal of work ahead of them. 134 As the Proskauer law firm
noted, “[c]overed entities and business associates will have to consider carefully how decisions
to delegate responsibility for tasks such as handling breach notification and their retention of
authority to provide instructions to their business associates and contractors with respect to
certain tasks will affect their exposure to liability.” 135 Updating and renegotiating BAAs, for
example, is a “massive” undertaking, especially for large health systems that can have as many
as 20,000 business associates. 136 On January 25, 2013, HHS published an updated sample
business associate agreement that may be of some assistance, although CEs and BAs almost
certainly will need to supplement this sample. 137 Negotiations could be more contentious and
protracted now that BAs’ direct liability gives them more reason to be cautious. 138
Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule was effective March 26, 2013, covered entities and
business associates have until September 23, 2013 to comply with most of its requirements. 139
Written contracts or other arrangements between CEs and BAs that were entered into before
January 25, 2013, complied with the law then in effect, and are not renewed or modified from
March 26, 2013 until September 23, 2013 will be deemed compliant with the Omnibus HIPAA
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Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance Help on Way HHS Rolling Out Web-based
Educational Tools (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/hipaa-omnibus-compliance-help-onway-a-5524.
134
See generally Leyva, supra note 71 (“HHS is saying that compliance with the HIPAA Security Rule was required
(to a degree) even before the HITECH Act and the HIPAA Omnibus Rule. Therefore, the new HIPAA Security Rule
requirements should just necessitate incremental adjustments. Although that may be true under the ‘letter of the
law,’ as a practical matter nothing could be further from the truth. Prior to the HITECH Act HIPAA was an
unenforced paper tiger. Business Associates have a lot of catching up to do, and for that matter, so do most Covered
Entities.”).
135
Proskauer, supra note 131. The standard for breach notice has changed due to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule.
Before, notification was only required if a breach caused a “significant risk of harm” to the data subjects. Deven
McGraw, Final HIPAA Rules a Major Step Forward, But There's More Work To Be Done, ihealthbeat (Feb, 8,
2013), http://www.ihealthbeat.org/perspectives/2013/final-hipaa-rules-a-major-step-forward-but-theres-more-workto-be-done.aspx. Now, however, notification is always required unless the discovering entity “demonstrates that
there is a low probability that the protected health information has been compromised based on a risk assessment” of
a number of listed factors.” Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5695.
136
Kendra Casey Plank, Bloomberg BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, Breach, Business Associate
Obligations Biggest Provisions in HIPAA Rule, Experts Say (Jan. 21, 2013), available at
http://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/newsID/c1deaa8b-8191-4cb4-9f52-1e7d61986de2/fuseaction/news.detail.
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U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servcs., Sample Business Associate Agreement Provisions (published Jan. 25,
2013), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/contractprov.html.
138
Anne Foster et al., BakerHostetler, Special Edition: Health Law Update: A Baker's Dozen of Significant Changes
from the HIPAA/HITECH Rule (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/special-edition-health-lawupdate-feb-42876/.
139
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.
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Rule until the earlier of the date it is renewed or modified on or after September 23, 2013; or
September 22, 2014. 140
4. Increased Penalties and Enforcement
This increased liability for BAs comes as HHS finalizes HITECH’s enhanced civil
monetary penalties for noncompliance with HIPAA’s requirements. 141 Before HITECH, HHS
could impose no greater than $100 for each violation, with an annual cap of $25,000 imposed on
a given covered entity for identical violations. 142 The Omnibus HIPAA Rule adopted a revised
penalty scheme with penalty amounts ranging from $100 to $50,000 per violation up to a
maximum aggregate penalty of $1.5 million for violations of an identical provision per calendar
year. 143 Thus, if CEs and BAs violate multiple provisions, the maximum aggregate penalty will
be $1.5 million per identical violation. 144
In addition to the threat of increased penalty amounts, OCR has indicated that it is
focused on increasing enforcement efforts, no matter the size of the entities. 145 Historically,
HIPAA enforcement has been lackluster. But Theodore J. Kobus III from Baker & Hostetler in
New York described OCR enforcement efforts as “aggressive” since HITECH. 146 Lynn Sessions
with Baker & Hostetler in Houston similarly noted that HHS increasingly has been pursuing
resolution agreements and civil penalties against “relatively small providers,” who “often are less
prepared to comply with HIPAA requirements.” 147
In April 2012, for example, OCR reached a $100,000 settlement with Phoenix Cardiac
Surgery, P.C. (“PCS”), a small cardiology practice. 148 PCS allegedly violated HIPAA by,
among other things, failing to enter BAAs with cloud service providers that stored and had
access to electronic PHI and failing to establish adequate policies and safeguards to protect
PHI. 149 OCR Director Leon Rodriguez recently indicated that enforcement under the Omnibus
HIPAA Rule “will become tougher” and will include enforcement resulting from breach
investigations and random audits. 150 Reportedly, from September 2009 through December 2012,
140

See 45 C.F.R. § 164.532(e).
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Providers (Feb. 18, 2013).
146
Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145.
147
Id.
148
Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145.
149
Id.
150
Cf., e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, Incentivising State False Claims Acts (last updated Mar. 7,
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/clarifying-requirements-for-a-state-false-claims-a.aspx
(last
141

SETON HALL LAW

II 25

OCR received 77,200 HIPAA complaints, investigated 27,500 cases, issued 18,600 corrective
actions, and collected $14.9 million in fines and resolution settlements. 151 According to Director
Rodriguez, OCR is “’looking for patterns of privacy and security breaches,’ including violations
that seem to be longstanding and have a high risk of causing harm to individuals.” 152
B.

HIPAA in the Cloud from a Patient’s Perspective

While patients appreciate that their healthcare provider will usually engage in due
diligence before selecting a cloud service provider, they nevertheless appreciate (if sometimes on
a visceral or intuitive level) the risks involved in cloud computing scenarios. As William Pewen
has observed, “Americans’ support for the use of their electronic health records (EHR)--even to
facilitate treatment and payment--is limited; 78 percent supported giving physicians access to
their EHR, while only 30 percent favored health plan access.” 153 Those numbers may well
degenerate as awareness of cloud computing increases. Whenever there is “sharing or storage by
users of their own information on remote servers owned or operated by others and accessed
through the Internet or other connections,” there is legitimate concern about additional
opportunities for hacks, breaches, or misuses to occur. 154
While covered entities and cloud service providers seek legal guidance as they work
together to safeguard health data, patients have an interest in assuring that their privacy is
protected. Privacy concerns of patients have slowed adoption of some digital records.155
Moreover, where privacy concerns have been ignored (as in the rapid dissemination of pharmacy

visited Mar. 15, 2013) (discussing how the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 included provisions designed to “create
incentives for states to enact anti-fraud legislation modeled after the federal False Claims Act”).
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World Privacy Forum, Privacy in the Clouds: Risks to Privacy and Confidentiality from Cloud Computing, at 4,
available at http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/WPF_Cloud_Privacy_Report.pdf (2009).
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See generally Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of Health Care Privacy, 32 J.L.
Med. & Ethics 680, 685 (2004). Patient concerns are not hypothetical; data breaches have been on the rise.
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data security breaches reported to the federal government over the past three years. See section 13402(e)(4) of the
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dossiers by reputational intermediaries in the early and mid-2000s), they have led to unfair,
invasive, and irremediable violations of the privacy of individuals. 156
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed some of these concerns. For example, by
rendering BAs directly liable for compliance with provisions of the Security and Privacy Rules,
it clarified what could have been a source of troubling regulatory arbitrage. 157 It applied data
security rules to “downstream entities,” making cloud service providers of EHR more
responsible. BAs are required to obtain assurances that disclosures they make (that are not
required by law) will be “confidential.” Civil penalties for BAs also provide important
incentives for proper behavior.
As rulemaking (and clarifications of rules) continue, predictable criticisms have been
launched. Some insist that complexity in their fields can never truly be grasped by regulators or
rendered clear to consumers. Others accuse HHS of engaging in stealth industrial policy, picking
winners and losers in the healthcare field by effectively outlawing certain business models and
promoting others. The question now is how to respect legitimate efforts to innovate, while still
protecting vital patient interests in privacy (and understanding how data is being used and
shared).
1. Patient Rights of Access to Records and Accountings of Disclosures
If patients are to fully “buy in” to digitization of health records (and the full array of
opportunities for use of them), they will need to be able to understand exactly how their digital
records exist (and are used) in an increasingly complex virtual landscape. Patients need to
engage in “the right to an accounting of disclosures of protected health information made by a
covered entity in the six years prior to the date on which the accounting is requested,” and to
have the information in formats that allow their own trusted interpreters to make sense of it.158
Before HITECH, the HIPAA Privacy Rule made it very difficult for patients to fully understand
the nature and range of health information accumulated about them, especially because
disclosures for “treatment, payment and health care operations” did not need to be accounted
for. 159 After HITECH, any record kept electronically needs to be in the accounting. 160
156
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BREACH TODAY (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.databreachtoday.com/hipaa-omnibus-rule-released-a-5433.
158
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Nevertheless, several critical decisions need to be made to assure that this is actually a
meaningful right for patients. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for HIPAA Privacy Rule
Accounting of Disclosures Under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, HHS recognized that “use of audit trails and the right to an accounting of disclosures
improve the detection of breaches and assists with the identification of weaknesses in privacy
and security practices.” 161 Audit logs record the activity taking place in an information-sharing
network, 162 including “queries made by users, the information accessed, information flows
between systems, and date- and time-markers for those activities.” 163 If audit logs are immutable
and pervasively attributable to entities accessing and using information, they should seriously
deter misuse of data. 164 HITECH tries to protect patients from misuse of their health information
by requiring the use of “audit trails” to record each instance of access to a record and creating
incentives for the use of encryption and other best practices. 165
160

Before HITECH, 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 restricted the right to an accounting of disclosures by exempting
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identification must be recorded when electronic health information is created, modified, accessed or deleted; and an
indication of which action(s) occurred and by whom must also be recorded.”).
162
Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, 28 C.F.R. § 23 (2012).
163
MARKLE TASK FORCE ON NAT’L SEC. IN THE INFO. AGE, MARKLE FOUND., IMPLEMENTING A TRUSTED
INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: USING IMMUTABLE AUDIT LOGS TO INCREASE SECURITY, TRUST, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2006). The Markle Foundation has worked on several important reports on deploying cutting
edge information technology in agencies, including HHS. Id. at 4.
164
For a discussion of the importance of immutable audit logs, see Citron & Pasquale, supra note 38, at 1473
(explaining that “immutable audit logs . . . [promote] data integrity and relevance. . . . [by] watermark[ing data] with
its provenance, assuring attributions and verifiability of observations (much as citations help assure the validity of an
assertion in an academic work)[and promoting] tethering and full attribution of data to allow corrections to
propagate through the system”) (internal citations omitted).
165
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Some industry comments on the HITECH rulemaking have vigorously opposed
aggressive implementation of consumer rights. 166 Nevertheless, HHS has confirmed the
importance of maintaining patients’ access to their records. Covered entities must provide
individuals “with access to the protected health information in the form and format requested by
the individual, if it is readily producible in such form and format.” 167 It also promoted
individuals’ rights to determine how their records had been used by guaranteeing an accounting
of disclosures. 168 In any twelve-month period, the first accounting requested by an individual
from a covered entity must be provided for free, within 60 days of the request (with some narrow
exceptions). 169
2. Encryption, De-Identification, and Best Practices in an Era of Breaches
Part II above described some potential cutting edge applications of cloud computing to
solve tough problems in pharmacovigilance and treatment customization. It suggested the
growing convergence of research and treatment functions in data-rich environments. 170 Two of

patients’ right to access and control of their PHI (including obtaining an audit trail showing all electronic
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an accounting by the same individual within the 12 month period, provided that the covered entity informs the
individual in advance of the fee and provides the individual with an opportunity to withdraw or modify the request
for a subsequent accounting in order to avoid or reduce the fee.”). Patients may also direct a CE to transmit a copy
of the record to a designee, and there are limits on the fee, which cannot be more than the labor cost involved, and
images and other linked data are to be included. Id.
170
Susan Wolf has done groundbreaking work on the growing importance of treatment issues in research settings,
and vice versa, in the context of “incidental findings” during research. Susan M. Wolf, Incidental Findings in

SETON HALL LAW

II 29

the most important issues affecting health technology policy are transparency and access.
Regulators must decide whether to permit innovators to control data flows in order to give them
incentives, and where such control must end in order to respect broader social concerns about
privacy. Individuals are justly concerned that data or specimens related to them can be used in
ways that compromise future opportunities. Research data may be even more sensitive than
entries about a patient’s existing conditions and complaints, since it can include direct and
incidental findings whose implications have not been fully considered and explored by the
patient. 171
These concerns are reflected in health privacy law; the question now is whether HIPAA
and cognate state laws can promote optimal standards for data collection, use, analysis, and
encryption. Entities covered by HIPAA are restricted in their uses of health information in many
analytic settings. 172 The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (the “Common
Rule”), the FDA framework of human-subject protections, and HIPAA and related regulations
create many obligations. 173 Breach notification laws encourage encryption. 174
One way to reassure patients that their data will not be misused is to reduce or encrypt the
linkage between data and its source. 175 Various legal regimes have created a complex set of
terminologies for indicating how well-linked given data is to its source. 176 Evans’s account of
the “networked” nature of pharmacogenomic discovery would help health IT policymakers grasp
the potential of information flows, and how unharmonized legal requirements can impede
Neuroscience Research: A Fundamental Challenge to the Structure of Bioethics and Health Law (Oxford Handbook
of Neuroethics, Judy Illes, Barbara Sahakian, eds., Oxford University Press, 2011).
171
See, e.g., Susan M. Wolf et. al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research: Analysis and
Recommendations, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 219, 241 (2008) (noting that an incidental finding may reveal sensitive
data the person may not want shared).
172
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1).
173
CARL COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS (2005).
174
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2010) (“A covered entity that accesses, maintains, retains, modifies, records, stores, destroys,
or otherwise holds, uses, or discloses unsecured protected health information…in the case of a breach . . . [must]
notify each individual whose unsecured protected health information has been or is reasonably believed by the
covered entity to have been, accessed, acquired, or disclosure as a result of such breach.”). Via breach notification
rules, HITECH encourages, but does not require, encryption, by reducing penalties for the loss of encrypted data.
Harley Geiger, HHS Should Require the Encryption of Portable Devices to Curb Health Data Breaches, CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (March 16, 2011), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/harley-geiger/hhs-should-requireencryption-portable-devices-curb-health-data-breaches. Encryption is an addressable, not a required, specification
under the Security Rule; however, a covered entity must comply with certain requirements in declining to implement
an addressable specification. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(d), 164.312(a)(2), (e)(2)(ii).
175
Geiger, supra note 174.
176
See Joseph Conn, Data Encryption Just One Option Under Security Law, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM, (May 12,
2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090512/NEWS/305129979
(explaining some of
the different levels of encryption in HIPAA, such as de-identified records compared to records with limited data
sets). Encryption can be an important defense against improper access. Brian T. Horowitz, Health Care IT:
Securing Health Care Information: 10 Ways to Defend Against Data Breaches, EWEEK.COM (Aug. 14, 2012),
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-IT/Securing-Health-Care-Information-10-Ways-to-Defend-Against-DataBreaches-762368/?kc=rss.
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innovation. 177 Limits on access and reuse reflect valid concerns: as endless stories of breaches
and new data uses proliferate, data subjects need more robust assurances about controlled data
dissemination. 178 As databases proliferate, the risk of re-identification of de-identified data
through the use of information from multiple publicly-available sources increases, so that fewer
data points are necessary to personally identify the subject of the data. Whatever rules govern
the emerging infrastructure of health data surveillance and sharing, they will need to be
complemented by monitoring that seeks to detect and deter inappropriate uses of information. 179
Part IV below proposes some methods of making that monitoring more effective, such as the
funding of technologists (such as the technologists funded by the FTC to help that agency
develop better mobile privacy policies) and the deployment of contingency-funded contractors
(such as the Recovery Audit Contractors (RACs) already deployed by CMS to detect and deter
fraud and abuse) —and perhaps even, in an era of big data, the types of de-identified data that
may eventually be re-identified. 180
3. Marketing, Sale, and the Vagaries of Consent
The Omnibus HIPAA Rule has helped clarify the obligations of CEs who want to engage
in sale, marketing, or research uses of protected health information. 181 For marketing, a CE
needs to obtain a patient’s authorization if it receives financial remuneration in exchange for
communicating about a health-related product or service. 182 Before the communication can be
made, the authorization must include the disclosure that the covered entity or business associate
is receiving financial remuneration from a third party for making the communication. There do
appear to be important exceptions, though. For example, communications about a drug or

177

Barbara Evans, Ethical and Privacy Issues in Pharmacogenomic Research, in PHARMACOGENOMICS:
APPLICATIONS TO PATIENT CARE 325 (Howard L. McLeod et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).
178
U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
BREACHES OF UNSECURED PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION 1, 9-10 (2009-10), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breachrept.pdf.
179
See generally Evans, supra note 177, at 313-38 (discussing the concerns and solutions regarding data flow).
180
For recent analyses of the re-identification issue, see Felix Wu, Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2031808 (Aug. 15, 2012); OCR, Guidance Regarding Methods
for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability
Act
(HIPAA)
Privacy
Rule,
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf.
181
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(1) covers the “sale of PHI,” which is a disclosure of PHI when the covered entity
receives direct or indirect “remuneration from or on behalf of the recipient of the PHI in exchange for the PHI.” The
Omnibus HIPAA Rule addressed marketing, research, fundraising, and sale of protected health information.
182
Financial remuneration is defined as “direct or indirect payment from or on behalf of a third party whose product
or service is being described.” 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. It appears that nonfinancial or in-kind consideration for such
communication is not covered by the marketing rule. See Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78
Fed. Reg. at 5596 (confirming “that the term ‘financial remuneration’ does not include non-financial benefits, such
as in-kind benefits, provided to a covered entity in exchange for making a communication about a product or
service”); id. at 5597 (noting “that non-financial or in-kind remuneration may be received by the covered entity or
its business associate and it would not implicate the new marketing restrictions”).
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biologic presently prescribed for a patient can be marketed if the payment is “reasonable.” For
sale of PHI, there is a prohibition, but there are multiple exceptions to that prohibition. 183
One key question raised here is how the consent and authorization for the use or
disclosure of PHI for marketing and sales purposes are to be arranged. 184 A scope of
authorization for subsidized communications can be broader than for merely a “single product or
service or the products or services of one third party.” 185 The preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA
Rule notes that the new authorization rules “provide covered entities with a more uniform system
for treating all remunerated communications.” 186 Furthermore, “where an individual signs an
authorization to receive such communications, the covered entity may use and disclose the
individual’s protected health information for the purposes of making such communications
unless or until the individual revokes the authorization pursuant to § 164.508(a)(5).” 187 Such
statements suggest an intent to streamline authorization requests, and models of consent that are
more blanket than specific.
On the other hand, Marla Durben Hirsch has argued that “use of ‘free’ EHRs may
violate” the Omnibus HIPAA Rule because of the complexity of consent required to assure
genuine acceptance and understanding of the business and treatment relationships they imply.
Having observed that “[p]hysicians using cloud-based electronic health records should expect to
see more pop-up and other types of advertisements from pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers,” 188 Hirsch cautions that they may require onerously specific consent. 189 An
183

These include exceptions for the sale, transfer, merger, or consolidation of all or part of a covered entity and for
related due diligence purposes if the recipient of the PHI is or will become a Covered Entity following the sale,
transfer or merger, and for research purposes. Posinelli Shughart, PC, Uses and Disclosures of PHI under the Final
Rule: Changes Related to Marketing, Research, Fundraising and the Sale of Protected Health Information and
Other Significant Changes (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uses-and-disclosures-of-phiunder-the-fi-55749/.
184
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3). Note that HHS’s generosity toward research uses of health information may lead to
some regulatory arbitrage, as entities might recharacterize information gathering as research. 45 C.F.R.
§164.508(b)(3)(iii) allows for compound authorizations for research, reversing an earlier policy that required studyspecific authorizations. Rachel Grunberger, HITECH Update #4: HHS Relaxes HIPAA Requirements for Research
&
BURLING
LLP,
INSIDE
PRIVACY
(Jan.
20,
2013),
Authorizations,
COVINGTON
http://www.insideprivacy.com/health-privacy/hitech-update-4-hhs-relaxes-hipaa-requirements-for-researchauthorizations/.
185
Final Omnibus HIPAA Rule Preamble, supra note 51, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5596.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Marla Durben Hirsch, EHRs the Latest Advertising Billboard for Manufacturers (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.fierceemr.com/story/ehrs-latest-advertising-billboard-manufacturers/2013-01-23.
189
Marla Durben Hirsch, Use of ‘Free’ EHRs May Violate New HIPAA Rule, http://www.fierceemr.com/story/usefree-ehrs-may-violate-new-hipaa-megarule/2013-01-29 (“[HIPAA now] requires providers to obtain patient
authorizations ‘for all treatment and healthcare operations communications where the covered entity receives
financial remuneration for making the communications for a third party whose product or service is being
marketed.’ . . . The megarule doesn't specifically address pop up ads in EHRs. But the purpose of the ads is to
market their products to physicians with the hope that they will prescribe, promote or sell them to patients. That
sounds just like the marketing that the megarule is addressing. If the physician then ‘communicates’ the product or
service in the ad without having patient authorization to do so, the physician is in violation of HIPAA.”).
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insightful commentator observes that entirely ad-based EHR business models may not run afoul
of marketing restrictions, but could be violating rules on sales of data if “the free EHR is
provided to the CE ‘primarily’ in exchange for the PHI to be entered into the EHR.” 190 The faint
distinctions between some uses of PHI for marketing and sales purposes (and potential
regulatory arbitrage via mere “access” to data) merit further guidance.
There is a tension between guidance cautioning that authorization be clear and prominent,
and cost-containment pressures that will demand streamlining of authorization procedures.
Perhaps the ideal solution will involve more granular and technically sophisticated consent
procedures, made possible by advances in computing. 191
Such efforts will take place in the shadow of a growing First Amendment jurisprudence
protecting data flows. There is already a vast and growing literature on the use of observational
data to promote medical research. 192 All involved understand undue restriction of information
flows may impede innovation and undermine public health. 193 But the commercial use of data to
market drugs and other interventions has not been adequately addressed by academics or
governmental entities. And even as they do move on this front, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. has hemmed in positive action somewhat by protecting certain sales of
information (albeit largely de-identified) as protected by the First Amendment. That decision

190

David Harlow, commenting at http://www.fierceemr.com/story/use-free-ehrs-may-violate-new-hipaamegarule/2013-01-29 (“It appears to me that the marketing rule would be implicated only if there were a direct or
indirect payment of money . . . . In-kind remuneration (e.g., provision of a free EHR) is excluded from the
definition. [But] [t]he free EHR may implicate other sections of the rule . . . The limitation on sale of PHI . . .
includes direct and indirect remuneration [whereas the limitation on marketing focuses on financial remuneration].
The commentary to the rule says that ‘a sale of protected health information occurs when the covered entity
primarily is being compensated to supply data it maintains in its role as a covered entity (or business associate).
Thus, such disclosures require the individual's authorization unless they otherwise fall within an exception at §
164.502(a)(5)(ii)(B)(2).’ 78 Fed. Reg 5606. Those exceptions are, essentially: (i) for public health purposes, (ii) for
research, so long as payment is limited to the sending CE's costs, (iii) for treatment and payment, (iv) in connection
with a sale or merger of the CE, (v) to or by a BA where the CE is just paying for the BA's services, (vi) to a patient
who requests access to his or her own PHI, (vii) as required by law or (viii) as otherwise permitted under HIPAA
where the remuneration covers costs only. None of these exceptions seems to apply.”).
191
P. Mork, et al., Architectures and Processes for Nationwide Patient-Centric Consent Management (2011);
Center for Transforming Health/MITRE Corp., Meaningful Choice: Enabling Patients to Selectively Manage Access
to Their Health Records (2011) (“MITRE’s research allows the patient to express their desired level of granular
control; it is then up to the record holder (such as the hospital) to request the current preferences and then use them
to package the records for the information exchange.”); Arnon Rosenthal, Digital Policies for Patient Consents: The
Thorny (and General) Technical Challenges, MITRE Corp. (2011) (“Our project is architecting and prototyping key
elements of a system to elicit and manage consents. All of a patient’s consent rules are to be managed in one place,
editable over the web, and accessible by authorized record holders.”).
192
Inst. of Med., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 141 (2009) (“observational studies play in increasingly
critical role” in research).
193
Clayton Christensen, THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION 14 (2007) (integrated information systems may be able to
condense some medical research into a matter of weeks or months, rather than the years that are customary now).
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struck down a Vermont law limiting data flows, despite documented concerns about the
interaction between, say, doctors and pharmacies in the brave new world of health informatics. 194
4. Are Non-Covered Entities Creating Medical Reputations?
Assume, for now, that all the issues raised above are adequately addressed by regulators
and stakeholders. Individuals would still be right to worry that their medical reputations—if not
their medical records—are being created in processes which they can barely control or
understand. As Nicolas Terry has explained, judgments about individuals’ health status do not
need to be based on medical records:
The health care sector and its stakeholders constitute an area
considerably larger than the HIPAA-regulated zone. As a result, some
traditional health information circulates in what may be termed a
HIPAA-free zone. Further, the very concept of health sector specific
regulation is flawed because health related or medically inflected data
frequently circulates outside of the traditionally recognized health care
sector. In both cases agreed-upon health privacy exceptionalism is
jeopardized. 195

In an era of Big Data, companies do not even need to consult the “health care sector” to impute
various medical conditions or disabilities to data subjects. Consider, for instance, Charles
Duhigg’s reporting on data mining by Target: the company prides itself on knowing whether
customers are pregnant. 196 ProPublica has documented data brokers’ interest in health-inflected
data:
Data companies can capture information about your "interests" in
certain health conditions based on what you buy — or what you
search for online. Datalogix has lists of people classified
as "allergy sufferers" and "dieters." Acxiom sells data on whether
an individual has an "online search propensity" for a certain
"ailment or prescription." 197
According to FTC Commissioner Julie Brill, “One firm, LeadsPlease.com, reportedly sells the
names, mailing addresses, and medication lists of people with diseases like cancer or clinical
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CVS Privacy Practices Need Investigation Despite FTC Order, Pharmacist Group Says,
18 Health L. Rep. 397 (BNA) (March 2009).
195
Nicolas Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data (Sept. 27, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2153269.
196
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Feb. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all.
197
Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You, PROPUBLICA, Mar. 7, 2013,
http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
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depression. Another data broker, ALC Data, reportedly offers lists of consumers, their credit
scores, and their specific ailments.” 198
It is clear that healthcare companies are also developing an interest in cognate data. 199
Consider all the sources that could collect such data:

Image Credit: Federal Trade Commission.

And how far data brokers could go to combine and recombine those sources:

198

Julie Brill, Reclaim Your Name, Keynote Address at Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference, June 26,
2013, at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/brill/130626computersfreedom.pdf.
199
Id. (“One health insurance company recently bought data on more than three million people's consumer
purchases in order to flag health-related actions, like purchasing plus-sized clothing, the Wall Street Journal
reported. (The company bought purchasing information for current plan members, not as part of screening people
for potential coverage.)”).
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Social networks have also intensified the surveillance of health-inflected data. But these
platform providers enjoy a largely deregulated online environment. As social networks
organized around personal health records like PatientsLikeMe provide novel and powerful
opportunities to address health issues and to form communities, they also open the door to
frightening and manipulative uses of data by firms and governments, employers, and ranking
intermediaries. 200
Social network profiles are sometimes less accessible than search engine results, thanks
to passwords and privacy settings. But many users never take steps to keep their profile private,
and data miners have already logged details of profiles. Facebook can suddenly reset defaults,
causing what James Grimmelmann calls “privacy lurches” to unexpectedly expose aspects of
profiles that users once thought were only visible to themselves and friends. Many users fail to
change the default settings, effectively making that part of their life online an “open book.”
200

A company called Acxiom has 1,600 pieces of information about 98% of United States adults, gathered from
thousands of sources. ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE 3 (2011). At least some of them are health-indicative or
health-predictive. Such information will only be more valuable to employers as self-insured health plans become
more common. DAN SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION (2009); Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping the
Consumer Genome, THE N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/acxiom-thequiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all.
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Moreover, lacking “visceral notice” of the accessibility of their profiles, many users explicitly or
implicitly assume that only their friends are seeing it (since they are usually the only group able
to comment on postings). Very few take the basic privacy step of logging out and then trying to
access their own account via another, “dummy” account, to see the picture of themselves that
they are broadcasting to the world at large.
What Daniel J. Solove has called the “digital person” has real consequences for the data
subject it is connected to, however unaware the latter may be of the former. According to a 2009
survey, 35% of employers have decided not to hire someone on the basis of content on the
applicant’s social media site. 201 Of those who did so, 44% found the candidate’s mention of
alcohol or drug use a “no-go” — and who is to know what types of inferences about health status
they may have derived from such information. 202 There are also legitimate worries about
discriminatory uses of information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination
laws or undetectable by workers. 203
Efforts to assure the fairness and accuracy of such reputation-affecting information have
not caught up to technological advances in producing it. For example, an investigating office
may tailor its software to assure that the most damaging information available about a person
(from its perspective) comes up first in whatever databases it queries. 204 The applicant would
need to use the same personalizing software to be fully aware of all the negative information
such a search was generating. Yet trade secrecy and contracts will likely prevent him from ever
accessing an exact replica of the programs used by the educators, employers, landlords, bankers,
and others making vital decisions about his future. Some digital scarlet letter could be floating in
the ether, prominent to those with certain filtering programs, and virtually invisible to others.
The cost of information storage has consistently declined over time, and recent
developments suggest even more dramatic advances toward “total recall” by computerized
networks. 205 As privacy expert Helen Nissenbaum has observed, “anything about an individual
201

CareerBuilders, Forty-Five Percent of Employers Use Social Networking Sites to Research Job Candidates,
CareerBuilder
Survey
Finds
(Aug.
19,
2009),
http://www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?id=pr519&sd=8/19/2009&ed=12/31/2009&sit
eid=cbpr&sc_cmp1=cb_pr519_&cbRecursionCnt=1&cbsid=8412d5b32ef54ce6854a035cf3a59d12-303995843-x36. Sites included not only personal ones, like Facebook, but also LinkedIn.
202
Another study found that as many as 50% of employers and 77% of job recruiters who have concerns about an
applicant’s alcohol or drug abuse, violence, or other similar problems will use the Internet to search potential
applicants. Richard A. Paul & Lisa Hird Chung, Brave New Cyberworld: The Employer’s Legal Guide to the
Interactive Internet, 24 LAB. LAW. 109, 116 (2008-2009).
203
Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health Records on the Workplace, 19 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 422 (2010) (raising the possibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based
on EHRs to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers”).
204
For fuller explanation of these technologies, see Frank Pasquale, Reputation Regulation, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET 111 (Martha Nussbaum & Saul Levmore, eds., 2010).
205
Victor Mayer-Schonberger, DELETE (2009).
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that can be rendered in digital form can be stored over indefinitely long periods and be readily
retrieved.” 206 Joseph Turow’s book, The Daily You, describes in great detail the kinds of profiles
that can result from the endless search for data. 207 Social networks can both generate and use
such data to create secret profiles. Those profiles, in turn, may be of interest to far more than
advertisers. Police and other officials need little more than a subpoena to review such files. 208
Data brokers are keen to monetize their information trove.
Health-inflected information from entities not covered as either CEs or BAs under
HIPAA can be a critical source of correlations, profiles, and attributions. Companies are not shy
about using and distributing the information; for example, PatientsLikeMe.com states “you
should expect that every piece of information you submit (even if it is not currently displayed)
may be shared with our partners and any member of PatientsLikeMe.” 209 Users were later
shocked to find that “Nielsen Co., [a] media-research firm . . . was ‘scraping,’ or copying, every
single message off PatientsLikeMe's private online forums.” 210 Had the virtual break-in not been
detected, health attributes connected to usernames (which, in turn, often can be linked to real
identities) could have spread into numerous databases.
For those in the individual insurance market, the risk of runaway health data has already
been realized. Patients who purchased antidepressants were later denied insurance repeatedly,
thanks to a dossier sold to insurers. Consider, for instance, the plight of Walter and Paula
Shelton, a Louisiana couple who sought insurance while in their fifties. 211 Paula had taken an
antidepressant as a sleep aid, and occasionally used a blood pressure medication to relieve some
swelling in her ankles. Humana, a large insurer based in Kentucky, refused to insure the couple
based on that prescription history. They were not able to find insurance from other carriers,
either. 212 No one had explained to them that a few prescriptions could render them uninsurable.
206

Helen Nissenbaum, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 36 (2008); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 129 (2004).
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Joseph Turow, THE DAILY YOU (2011) (describing online internet advertising markets for data).
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Chris Hoofnagle, Big Brother's Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect,
Process, and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 595 (Summer 2004).
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PatientsLikeMe FAQ, http://www.patientslikeme.com/help/faq/Corporate (“Except for the restricted personal
information you entered when registering for the site, you should expect that every piece of information you submit
(even if it is not currently displayed) may be shared with our partners and any member of PatientsLikeMe, including
other patients.”).
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Julia Angwin & Steve Stecklow, 'Scrapers' Dig Deep for Data on Web, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 11,
2010, 9:30 p.m. ET), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703358504575544381288117888.html.
211
Terhune, supra note 156 (“Two-thirds of all health insurers are using prescription data--not only to deny
coverage to individuals and families but also to charge some customers higher premiums or exclude certain medical
conditions from policies, according to agents and others in the industry.”).
212
Uninsured people like the Sheltons can count on some help from the Affordable Care Act, the landmark
legislation passed in 2010. That law will require insurers to guarantee issue of policies. They can still charge people
in their 50s three times as much as they charge those in their 20s, but those with a prescription history will not have
to worry about flat rejections. PPACA sec. 1201(4), § 2702(a)–(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1(a)–(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1A 2010) (requiring acceptance of all applicants, but allowing limitation to certain “open or special
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Indeed, the model for blackballing them may still have been a gleam in an entrepreneur’s eye
when Mrs. Shelton obtained her drugs. It became a big business: prescription-reporting service
Intelliscript claimed in 2008 that clients using it reported “financial returns of 5:1, 10:1, even
20:1.”
According to BusinessWeek's Chad Terhune, who first reported on the Sheltons, use of
prescription data has been widespread in the individual insurance market. 213 Insurers tailored
policies to exclude pre-existing conditions, or to charge some members more. Companies like
MedPoint and Intelliscript gathered millions of records from pharmacies, avoiding privacy
restrictions on hospital and physician records. 214 They then sold them on to insurers eager to
gain a competitive advantage by avoiding the sick. Since 1% of patients account for over one
fifth of healthcare costs, and 5% account for nearly half of costs, an insurer who can “cherry
pick” the healthy and “lemon drop” the sick will be far more profitable than those who take all
comers. 215 Even though PPACA’s guaranteed issue provisions and exchanges will help deter
such underwriting practices, it is by no means clear that health reform can address all the varied
ways in which insurers can try to shift high-risk individuals to undesirable plans, or self-insured
employers can adopt pretextual tactics to drive them away as employees.
The FTC is supposed to deter “unfair and deceptive” trade practices, particularly those
that can harm consumer reputations. The FTC determined that MedPoint and Intelliscript had
violated the law by keeping their systems secret from consumers. But the agency imposed no
penalties, and its judgment against them barely put a dent in their business practices. The FTC
merely required that the prescription data brokers tell consumers if their file caused a denial of
coverage or other adverse action. There is no privacy here, just a chance at ensuring accuracy: all
the consumer can do in response is review the record and try to correct it if it is wrong. 216

enrollment” periods); PPACA sec. 1201, § 2701(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(1)(A) (permitting 3 to 1 agebased pricing differentials). They will, however, want to think about how data brokers’ other forms of
categorization may inform other, subtler forms of risk selection by employers and insurers.
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Terhune, supra note 156.
214
Intelliscript Complaint, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212complaint.pdf. Less harmful uses of the
information may also be troubling to consumers, or may end up going beyond their original purposes. See, for
instance, concerns raised in Weld v. CVS Pharmacy (pharmacy sold names and contact information of customers to
allow a direct marketer to target customers with specific medical conditions).
215
Statistics are from the Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality, or AHRQ.
216
Agreement
Containing
Consent
Order
(Milliman/Intelliscript),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/2070917agree0623189.pdf; Decision and Order (Milliman/Intelliscript),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212do.pdf; Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment, http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/2070917analysis0623189.pdf; Notice in Federal Register,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2007/september/070928milliman.pdf;
Intelliscript
Complaint,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623189/080212complaint.pdf; Medpoint Agreement Containing Consent Order,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0623190/070917agree0623190.pdf.
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Meanwhile, data brokers quietly continue gathering information, and making predictions
based on it. 217 MedPoint and Intelliscript developed methods of estimating the likely cost of
claims of an insured person, expressed as a numerical score. That opinion could be very
valuable to lenders, employers, and just about any other entity with a stake in a person’s future.
But the companies are under no obligation to disclose how it is computed. It is numbers like
these, and concomitant risk assessments and denials of opportunity that will matter to the 21st
century health data subject just as much as opportunities to track and understand health data
flows.
For about half of American workers, their employers bear some direct financial risk
should they become ill. 218 Whatever their ethical commitments, data-driven managers will be
forced by market demands to try to avoid the productivity drag of a sick or otherwise impaired
workforce, unless very strong laws and enforcement penalties deter such behavior. Sharona
Hoffman has predicted the growing use of “complex scoring algorithms based on electronic
health records to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost
workers.” 219 These methods are already used in life insurance. 220 Moreover, companies can skip
covered health records altogether and use other medically inflected data to predict an employee’s
overall vitality or productivity. For example, a wide waist, or multiple visits to the Coca Cola
websites, could reflect a predisposition to diabetes. While anti-discrimination laws militate
against decisions based on such data, it is increasingly difficult for those affected to understand
(let alone prove) how health-inflected data affected decision-making about them.
This is in part because the amount of data gathered by third and fourth party entities is
immense; the inferences they enable are even more staggering. Data miners need not ask a
person directly about clothing sizes; they might merely keep track of whether he visits a “big &
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Sarah Ludington, supra note 156, at 162. There are also legitimate worries about discriminatory uses of
information either not covered by extant privacy or anti-discrimination laws, or undetectable by workers. Hoffman,
Employing E-Health, supra note 203, 422 (raising the possibility of a growing use of “complex scoring algorithms
based on EHRs to determine which individuals are likely to be high-risk and high-cost workers.”).
218
As Ann Marie Marciarille observes, “an estimated 59% of private sector workers with health coverage are
enrolled in self-insured plans (up from 41% in 1998).” Marciarille, Self-Insurance Among Small Employers Under
the ACA, Missouri State of Mind, at http://delong.typepad.com/annmariemarciarille/2013/02/self-insurance-bysmall-employers-under-the-aca.html, Feb. 18, 2013. Self-insured status has become popular for many reasons; for
example, the self-insured employer can more easily avoid state insurance regulation because of ERISA preemption.
Furrow et al., HEALTH LAW (Rev. 6th Ed., 2008). Though many of these companies buy stop-loss insurance to
mitigate their own risks, even if they are very well-insured in that respect, productivity losses due to illness (and
particularly chronic illness) are well-documented.
219
Hoffman, Employing E-Health, supra note 156, at 422.
220
Frank Pasquale, Online Health Data in Employers’ and Insurers’ Predictive Analytics, CONCURRING OPINIONS,
Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/11/online-health-data-in-employers-and-insurerspredictive-analytics.html (“Did you know that buying generics instead of brands could hurt your credit? Or that a
subscription to Hang Gliding Monthly could scare off life insurers? Or that certain employers’ access to electronic
health records could lead them to classify you as “high-risk” or “high-cost”?”).
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tall” clothing store, on- or offline. 221 So many online activities have some implications about a
person’s health status that access to medical records is not necessary to construct a medical
reputation. 222 Harvest enough data about the food consumers buy, how often they go to the gym,
the size of their clothing, their educational attainment and interests, and “big data” mavens will
be happy to predict their likely health outcomes.
After the FTC’s intervention, consumers should be able to locate and correct errant
pharmacy record files now. But consumer protection agencies have nowhere near the staff they
would need to monitor all companies trafficking in reputational data. Unattributed data sources
are used to make critical judgments about individuals. 223
IV.

Recommendations
A.

Increasing Business Associate Compliance: Mandatory Business Associate
Agreement Terms, Education, and Increased Enforcement

Although the Omnibus HIPAA Rule gives teeth to HIPAA by extending liability down
the chain, many cloud service providers seem unwilling or unable to accept the implications of
HHS’s enforcement authority. This issue should be a priority for regulators, particularly as they
implement audits for CEs and BAs, 224 and consider expanding the program. 225
A chorus of legal advisories agrees that the Omnibus HIPAA Rule reaches many cloud
service providers. David Holtzman of OCR’s Health Information Privacy Division, for example,
has warned CEs, “’If you use a cloud service, it should be your business associate. If they refuse

221

See Duhigg, supra note 196 (“Almost every major retailer, from grocery chains to investment banks to the U.S.
Postal Service, has a “predictive analytics” department devoted to understanding not just consumers’ shopping
habits but also their personal habits, so as to more efficiently market to them.”).
222
Just as life insurers dig into subscription records to find out if an applicant subscribes to Hang Gliding Monthly
or Cigar Aficionado, employers are going to want to know more intimate details of employees’ lives, especially as
the cost of data and its analysis declines.
223
Frank Pasquale, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: TECHNOLOGIES OF REPUTATION, SEARCH, AND FINANCE (under contract with
Harvard University Press; forthcoming, 2014).
224
Audit authority is described at 42 U.S.C. § 17940 (2009) (“The Secretary shall provide for periodic audits to
ensure that covered entities and business associates that are subject to the requirements of this subtitle and subparts
C and E of part 164 of title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, as such provisions are in effect as of the date of
enactment of this Act, comply with such requirements”). To monitor covered entities to assure they are complying
by HIPAA requirements, OCR launched an audit program in November 2011 as part of its health information
privacy and security compliance program.
225
Business associates were “immune from audit selection during the 2012 pilot phase, but this is expected to
change should OCR expand the program in 2013, as HITECH explicitly subjects business associates to the HIPAA
audits as well.” Richard B. Wagner, Early Results from New HIPAA Audit Pilot Reveal Emphasis on Policy
Documentation and Business Associate Agreements, ABA HEALTH eSOURCE, May, 2012, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/aba_health_esource_home/aba_health_law_esource_0512_wag
ner.html.
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to sign a business associate agreement, don’t use the cloud service.” 226 Advice abounds as to
what BAAs with cloud service providers should include to minimize risks of HIPAA liability
and ensure HIPAA compliance, such as elements to permit a risk assessment and risk
management process. 227
Yet some of the most powerful cloud service providers refuse to execute BAAs with CEs
or BAs. Amazon, for example, reportedly has “taken the position that it is not required to sign
BAAs with companies that run HIPAA applications and/or permanently store PHI on [Amazon
Web Services].” 228 Art Gross has represented that cloud service providers Google, Yahoo, and
AOL are not willing to sign a BAA with a CE. 229 There are reports that many cloud service

226

Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145; see also Art Gross, HIPAA Omnibus and Microsoft Office 365 (Feb. 16,
2013), http://www.hipaasecurenow.com/index.php/hipaa-omnibus-and-microsoft-office-365/ (“If the CE is using
Cloud Providers such as Google, Yahoo or AOL and they are sending PHI, then the Cloud Provider would be
considered a HIPAA Business Associate. As a Business Associate, each of the Cloud Providers would be required to
sign a HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) with the CE.”); Bianchi et al., supra note 57 (“OCR has made
it clear that cloud vendors are business associates, even if they do not access PHI. This analysis is important as
cloud-based solutions become more widespread in the health care industry.”); Attorney: HIPAA Rules Change Game
DATA
MANAGEMENT
(March
21,
2013),
for
Cloud
Companies,
HEALTH
http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/issues/21_3/Attorney-HIPAA-Rules-Change-Game-for-Cloud-Companies45749-1.html (“Many cloud companies have taken the view that they are not business associates under HIPAA, but
some of them now will be . . . . [A] company that maintains data is a BA even if it doesn't access the data. I think
that will have implications for the cloud industry.”) (quoting Robert Belfort, partner in the health care practice at law
firm Manatt, Phelps & Phillips).
227
See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145 (itemizing what, at minimum, a HIPAA-compliant BAA between a
CE and cloud computing entity should include “to obtain[] the operational and cost efficiencies of cloud computing,
but, to help avoid the risk of a costly HIPAA violation”); Alex Ruoff, BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, Data
Security Should Be High Priority For Cloud Storage Users, White Paper Says (Jan. 7, 2013) (identifying elements
of a proper risk assessment and risk management process what should be addressed when entering a BAA with a
cloud vendor to mitigate liability, as outlined in a white paper by Foley & Lardner LLP); Alex Ruoff, BNA Health
IT Law & Industry Report, OCR Could Include Cloud Provision In Forthcoming Omnibus HIPAA Rule (Jan. 7,
2013) (describing call for guidance from Deborah Peel, founder of Patient Privacy Rights, “that highlights the
lessons learned from the Phoenix Cardiac Surgery case while making clear that HIPAA does not prevent providers
from moving to the cloud,” including “request for technical safeguards for cloud computing solutions, such as risk
assessments of and auditing controls for cloud-based health information technologies; security standards that
establish the use and disclosure of individually identifiable information stored on clouds; and requirements for cloud
solution providers and covered entities to enter into a business associate agreement outlining the terms of use for
health information managed by the cloud provider”); Reece Hirsch, BNA Health IT Law & Industry Report, What
Every General Counsel Should Know About Privacy and Security: 10 Trends for 2013 (Feb. 25, 2013) (summarizing
opinion 05/2012, guidance on cloud computing from the European Union Article 29 Working Group, advising
“cloud customers to maximize oversight of cloud arrangements, recommending that cloud customers conduct a
comprehensive data protection risk assessment before selecting a cloud provider . . . [and identifying] 14 specific
issues that cloud customers should address in cloud service agreements”).
228
rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, HIPAA BAA Agreement, Omnibus Rules New As of Jan
2013 (Feb. 6, 2013), https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?messageID=428426.
229
Gross, supra note 226; see also Leyva, supra note 71 (noting that even though Google would be a business
associate if a CE or BA uses a tool like Google Apps to store PHI, it is unlikely a company like Google would enter
into the contract now required by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule).
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providers do not believe that they are bound by HIPAA. 230 Others may feel free to ignore
HIPAA’s commands because enforcement seems unlikely. 231
When cloud service providers do enter contracts with CEs or BAs, they often use their
disproportionate bargaining power to insist that their customers “enter into standard, nonnegotiable agreements,” particularly with “low value contracts and community cloud
contracts.” 232 One attorney who provides legal advice to a Fortune 100 company said that cloud
service providers refuse to negotiate the terms of a BAA. At best they might offer to share the
results of a third party audit. But such audits do not excuse the CE or BA from complying with
HIPAA’s written contract requirement. 233
It is possible that the liability provisions in the Omnibus HIPAA Rule will convince
resistant cloud service providers to rethink their position on BAAs since they bear direct and
potential agency liability for subcontractor BAs under the Rule. 234 For example, after radio
silence for three weeks, Amazon on February 27, 2013 finally responded to a customer’s web
forum inquiry about whether it was reconsidering its refusal to sign BAAs, in light of the
Omnibus HIPAA Rule, responding that Amazon is “in the process of considering the impact of
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See, e.g., Belfort et al., supra note 69 (noting that HHS’s interpretation that vendors maintaining PHI are BAs
even when they do not require routine access to PHI appears “to impose HIPAA requirements on certain cloud
computing companies and other data storage vendors that previously took the position they were not business
associates”); Patrick Ouellette, HIPAA Omnibus Responsibility Focus Shift: Legal Q&A (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://healthitsecurity.com/2013/01/22/hipaa-omnibus-responsibility-focus-shift-legal-qa/ (“Every subcontractor
involved is going to have HIPAA Security Rule obligations and some of them may not even know it.”); Plank,
Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145 (“But some attorneys have worried that subcontractors, who do work
involving protected health information, will not realize they are now covered.”); Steve Swann, Anitian Blog,
Analysis of the HIPAA Omnibus Rule (Feb. 12, 2013), http://blog.anitian.com/?p=348 (“This means a lot of
companies who do not think HIPAA applies to them, are now required to be HIPAA compliant.”).
231
Of course, as discussed below, not all cloud providers refuse to execute BAAs. Some understand and are willing
to comply with HIPAA’s requirements, including the requirement to sign a BAA. Melissa Markey observes that
these cloud providers, which typically qualify for federal government contracts, tend to be more expensive, but they
are “much cheaper than a breach response.” Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors).
232
Classen, supra note 7, at 21.
233
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Health Information Privacy: FAQ (created Dec. 19, 2002; last
updated Mar. 14, 2006), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/business_associates/237.html (“Instead of
entering into a contract, can business associates self-certify or be certified by a third party as compliant with the
HIPAA Privacy Rule? Answer: No. A covered entity is required to enter into a contract or other written arrangement
with a business associate that meets the requirements at 45 CFR 164.504(e)”); see also David Kidd, What Does It
Take to Be HIPAA-Compliant in the Cloud?, THE DATA CENTER JOURNAL (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.datacenterjournal.com/it/hipaacompliant-cloud/ (“Many technology companies are announcing the
availability of their HIPAA-compliant cloud solutions, and it is important for health-care companies to understand
what such a solution entrails [sic]. Employing these solutions does not mean the customer is no longer responsible
for meeting specific HIPAA requirements for their applications, data and IT infrastructure. In fact, some HIPAA
requirements will always be the sole responsibility of the customer, not the cloud provider.”).
234
See Proskauer, supra note 131; Plank, Enforcement, Compliance, supra note 145.
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[the Omnibus] rule to AWS.” 235 One commenter noted that “[t]his is the single show-stopping
item that is preventing my company from moving all our infrastructure to AWS.” 236
While Amazon is considering its position, it has been reported that Microsoft will sign a
BAA with a CE that uses the Microsoft Office 365 platform, “a cloud solution that provides
email, instant messaging, calendaring, file and data storage, etc.” 237 Perhaps this is evidence that
the market is reacting to the liability risks made plain by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule. If Microsoft
starts signing BAAs, this is sure to put pressure on the market. 238 Another commenter on
Amazon’s Web Service discussion board posted that he was pursuing alternatives with a
competitor who would enter a BAA with it because it has “a responsibility to remain
compliant.” 239 Another posted a link to Azure, whom it claimed was issuing BAAs. 240 These
reports suggest that perhaps some of the negotiation imbalance may be starting to self-correct.
HHS should consider how it can help this evolution progress. Recognizing that cloud
service providers often have a bargaining advantage vis-à-vis CEs or BAs, HHS could require
that BAAs contain certain terms that some cloud service providers to date have resisted but that
will enable CEs and BAs to evaluate whether cloud vendors are complying with HIPAA. For
example, HHS could consider requiring BAAs to include certain security provisions, such as
requiring cloud vendors to provide an audit certification that complies with the Statement on
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC),
Type II, or an equivalent audit; 241 a summary of the vendor’s security plan; a summary of the
disaster response and continuity of operations plan; an executive summary of a risk assessment
performed at least annually and potentially whenever there are significant changes to the
computing environment and/or there are new threats or vulnerabilities identified; and access for
the security officer of the CE or BA to speak to the security officer of the cloud vendor. 242 HHS
also could consider when it may be appropriate to require cloud vendors to grant access to its
data center so the CE or upstream BA may examine the vendor’s physical security. Although it
may go too far to require cloud vendors to permit CEs or upstream BAs to conduct remote scans
of the cloud’s system, another option is to require the cloud vendor to agree to share a high level
235

rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, supra note 228; AWS is Amazon’s could computing
service.
236
Id.
237
Gross, supra note 226.
238
C.f. id. (“Microsoft has built a very affordable, HIPAA compliant cloud service and is clearly aiming at CEs of
all sizes. It will be interesting to see how Google, Yahoo and AOL respond. How long Microsoft enjoys the only
HIPAA compliant cloud service niche is still left to be seen.”).
239
rudi2001, Amazon Web Services Discussion Forums, supra note 228.
240
Id.
241
For more information about SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audits, see Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 25-26. A
clean SSAE 16 SOC 2, Type II audit provides a useful indication that the vendor takes seriously its security
responsibilities.
242
See id. at 23, 33; Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors); Notes from Telephone Interview of
Melissa Markey, Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors).
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summary of the results of a penetration scan performed by a mutually agreeable, qualified, and
authorized pen tester, which would yield similar information regarding the security of the cloud
vendor. 243
HHS also could consider requiring a term in the BAA to apportion liability for HIPAA
violations in accordance with each party’s responsibility. Several advisories have recommended
that parties negotiate indemnification terms, 244 given the exposure to direct and agency liability
contemplated by the Omnibus HIPAA Rule. Some vendors maintain that these terms no longer
are appropriate because they are directly liable to HHS. But as Melissa Markey, Esq. and
Margaret Marchak, Esq. have pointed out, direct liability to HHS does not necessarily mean the
CE will not be liable for a breach. 245 If the cloud provider caused the breach, the CE may want
“to require the business associate to protect the covered entity from costs and losses due to the
failure of the business associate to comply with the agreement.” 246 Despite the continued
importance of indemnification clauses to cloud contracting, however, some CEs may lack
sufficient bargaining power to extract (or may not know to ask for) such a clause from a cloud
service provider. A requirement in the BAA for the parties to apportion liability between the
parties based on fault arguably would give each party an incentive to comply with HIPAA to
avoid liability. Such a clause, however, would not protect the parties from enforcement by HHS
because HITECH and the Omnibus HIPAA Rule establish the liability of CEs and BAs. 247
HHS also can look for ways to educate the CEs and cloud service providers of HIPAA’s
reach, requirements, and penalties in the hope of increasing compliance. As Stephen Wu, a
partner at Cooke Kubrick and Wu LLP, has noted, "If you don't know you're a business associate
. . . you might not be taking all the steps you need to comply.’” 248 To this end, HHS’ Office of
Civil Rights is designing online educational resources to help healthcare organizations and BAs
243

See Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with authors); Notes from Telephone Interview of Melissa Markey,
Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors); Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 22-24.
244
See, e.g., Proskauer, supra note 131 (recommending that “both covered entities and business associates should
now consider seeking indemnification in their business associate agreements”); Anne Foster et al., supra note 138
(“Covered entities are encouraged to shore up their business associate agreements to include indemnification
language and consider cyber liability insurance requirements when contracting with business associates.”).
245
Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 4.
246
Id. Ms. Markey also generally seeks to carve out HIPAA compliance from any limitations of liability in cloud
contracts, such as disclaimers of consequential and/or punitive damages. See Notes from Telephone Interview of
Melissa Markey, Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors); Notes from Melissa Markey, Esq. (on file with
authors).
247
See, e.g., Spencer & Wagner, supra note 145 (“Although the parties can sign agreements and decide which
entities will be financially responsible for certain activities, ‘you cannot avoid the federal government. Now that
business associates are liable under statute, you can't have a contract that says business associates are not liable for
anything,’ [Joy] Pritts[, chief privacy officer at the HHS Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT,] said. If
the federal government ‘decides the business associate was the one responsible, they still have the ability to enforce
against the business associate,’ Pritts said.”); Anne Foster et al., supra note 138 (“Business associates cannot avoid
regulatory liability by refusing to sign a business associate agreement or limiting liability in those agreements.”).
248
Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, HIPAA Omnibus: The Liability Chain: Expert Explains Compliance Flow (Feb. 13,
2013), http://www.healthcareinfosecurity.com/interviews/hipaa-omnibus-liability-chain-i-1787.
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comply with the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, which OCR intends to release on its web site around
March 26, 2013, when the Rule is effective. 249 These resources will include: a breach risk
assessment tool to help CEs and BAs assess if notification is required; guidance to help CEs
comply with the minimum necessary standard when dealing with BAs and others; compliance
tools focused on helping smaller healthcare entities; modified HIPAA training for state attorneys
general that CEs may use; and consumer materials, such as YouTube videos and multilingual
fact sheets that explain patient rights and other aspects of the Rule. 250 HHS should expand these
planned educational efforts by developing educational materials targeted to cloud service
providers to help them understand their responsibilities and liability exposure under HIPAA.
HHS also should work to empower CEs and upstream BAs with information about cloud
provider liability and resources available to help them evaluate potential vendors from a security
standpoint. According to Melissa Markey, CEs do not always appreciate that they have
bargaining power and options such that they can walk away from cloud vendors who refuse to
execute BAAs or provide any information about their security practices. 251 Ms. Markey and Ms.
Marchak reject vendors’ defense that they must keep their processes confidential to maintain
security, retorting that, “security by obscurity is not a good policy.” 252 While some details of the
security operations must remain confidential, they believe the security officers from the customer
and vendor can share much information without jeopardizing security to “allow the customer to
evaluate whether security is reasonable.” 253 Education of all parties is critical to have
meaningful negotiations.
CMS’s deployment of integrity contractors to address problems of errors in payments and
claims may provide one model of education toward compliance, if Congress is willing to
authorize and provide initial investment in more calibrated interventions to assure compliance.
CMS has pioneered innovative deployments of private sector contractors in social welfare
programs. It has used “fiscal intermediaries (FIs), carriers, and durable medical equipment
regional carriers (DMERCs) to process Part A, Part B, and durable medical equipment (DME)
claims for reimbursement” for decades, and Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs) to
assess the value and effectiveness of care offered. 254 The agency has also employed a wide array
of contractors to detect and deter improper payments, sometimes funding the contractors with a
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See McGee, HIPAA Omnibus Compliance, supra note 133.
See id.
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See Notes from Telephone Interview of Melissa Markey ,Esq. on May 17, 2013 (on file with authors).
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Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 24.
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Id.
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Sara Kay Wheeler et al., Meet the Fraud Busters: Program Safeguard Contractors and Zone Program Integrity
Contractors, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1 (2011) (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 421.100 (FIs), 421.200 (carriers), 421.210
(DMERCs), and describing the functions of each)); see also CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES,
MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL § 1.3.6 (last updated Nov. 20, 2009); 42 C.F.R. § 421.304 (describing the
function of Medicare Integrity Program Contractors).
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percentage of the improper claims detected. 255 Perhaps HIPAA fines could be deployed in a
similar way, to provide a sustainable ecosystem of self-funding to expert entities capable of
monitoring a rapidly changing technical landscape.
CMS is committed to “developing new methods and technologies to stay ahead of
criminals and identify their patterns of behavior early” and “data analysis to identify cases of
suspected fraud, waste and abuse.” 256 The Medicare Program Integrity Manual governs
Medicare fraud-detection contractors, along with applicable Statements of Work. 257 According
to the Manual, comprehensive error rate testing (“CERT”) contractors “establish[] error rates and
estimates of improper payments.” 258 The Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) “detect and
correct improper payments in the Medicare FFS [fee for service] program and provide
information to CMS, [affiliated contractors] ACs and [medicare administrative contractors]
MACs.” 259 Once these surveillance entities produce data, Medicare Administrative Contractors
[“MACs”] can identify program vulnerabilities and develop approaches to respond to wayward
providers. 260 Their medical reviews do not have to culminate in charges or prosecutions; rather,
“prepayment edits” and provider education are preferred in many situations. 261 These
contractors are emerging as sophisticated analysts of data. They engage not only in reactive but
255

Timothy Martin, Revenue-Cycle Management and Reimbursement: The Impact of Health Law and Health
Reform on Providers, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 159 (2011) (discussing the creation and authorization of
contractors and the methods utilized in analyzing claims); see also Mark E. Reagan & Mark A. Johnson, Taming the
Medicaid Beast: The Federal Government’s Ambitious Attempt to Combat Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 3 J.
HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1 (2010) (explaining “the role and duties of Medicaid Integrity Contractors”).
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Anatomy of a Fraud Bust: From Investigation to Conviction: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Finance, 112th
Cong. (2012) (testimony of Peter Budetti), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/04/t20120424a.html.
257
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 254, § 1.1
(“Medicare administrative contractors (MACs), comprehensive error rate testing (CERT) contractors, recovery audit
contractors (RACs), program safeguard contractor (PSCs) and zone program integrity contractors (ZPICs) shall
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Id § 1.3.1. (“error rates produced by the CERT program” are used to “identify where to target [] improper
payment prevention efforts”). A Fraud Prevention System (FPS) runs “predictive algorithms and other sophisticated
analytics nationwide against all Medicare fee-for-service claims . . . prior to payment.” Assessing Medicare and
Medicaid Program Integrity: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Org., Efficiency, & Fin. Mgmt. of the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Peter Budetti), available at
http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/2012/06/t20120607a.html.
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CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE PROGRAM INTEGRITY MANUAL, supra note 254,
§ 1.3.1(C). “[I]t is difficult to prevent all improper payments, considering that more than 1 billion claims are
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Id. at § 1.3.1.B (Medicare contractors “primarily use error rates produced by the CERT program and
vulnerabilities identified through the RAC program to identify where to target their improper payment prevention
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Medical Appeals Council reviews are designed to spot errors. The Medicare Program Integrity Manual advises
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SETON HALL LAW

II 47

proactive efforts to identify problems, combing records for outliers. They can access a wide
array of information sources. 262
Truly assuring the privacy and security of data in the cloud may require intense and finegrained surveillance. Just as David Ticoll and Don Tapscott predicted in 2003 that “radical
transparency” would shake up the business world, 263 CMS’s myriad contractors are motivating
healthcare providers to modernize their practices. 264
Surveillance “serves as a means, made
possible by increasingly effective technologies of recording and preservation, to allow the
replaying of the past in the future.” 265 Moreover, monitoring and assessment critically involve
“assertions of power over what can be seen/recorded/reduced.” 266 The mere threat of intense
assessment of interventions can increase productivity. 267 Work can be performed more
efficiently as it is recorded and studied. 268 New forms of regulation depend on rapid
accumulation of data, and auditors should not shy away from benchmarking ideals for
continuous quality improvement at cloud service providers. 269
It may be possible to attribute some of cloud vendors’ deafness to HIPAA’s requirements
to the relatively low number of enforcement actions brought against CEs and BAs. Many
penalty actions originate from CEs that self-reported breaches while those who flout the
regulatory system remain untouched. This creates a regrettable disincentive for compliance.
HHS should exercise its power to conduct audits over cloud service providers to root out
noncompliance and hopefully encourage a culture of compliance. Given resource constraints
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that might limit efforts to increase Federal HIPAA enforcement, HHS also could study whether
the States could be better incentivized to assist with HIPAA enforcement. 270
B.

Study Assessing Feasibility of Limited Safe Harbor for Covered Entities Engaged
in Best Practices

It seems like sound policy to encourage upstream HIPAA entities to provide guidance
and supervision to downstream entities. There are several reasons, however, that CEs or BAs
contracting with cloud service providers might not exercise this supervisory role.
For one, as discussed in Section IV.A.1. above, cloud service providers enjoy strong
bargaining power and thus sometimes demand that CEs and BAs sign form contracts. It is
unlikely cloud service providers will volunteer to be controlled and directed during their
performance under the BAA, opting instead for independence and flexibility. HHS could
address the bargaining power disparity and encourage downstream supervision by requiring
BAAs to include terms that preserve a monitoring role for CEs and BAs.
Even without the bargaining imbalance, a CE or BA may be reluctant to reserve the right
or authority to control a downstream BA’s conduct 271 for fear of being held liable for the agent’s
violations even though the CE or BA lacks any real ability to control the agent’s behavior. HHS
expressed its understanding in the preamble to the Omnibus HIPAA Rule that a BA could still be
acting within the scope of agency if it deviated from the terms of the BAA by, for example,
acting carelessly, making a mistake, or disregarding the CE or upstream BA’s specific
instruction. 272 Thus, it appears that although agency liability requires the principal to have the
authority to control the BA’s conduct by, for example, being able to give instructions during the
course of the agent’s performance of the service, agency liability does not necessarily lapse when
the agent does not heed the principal’s instructions. A CE or BA may not want to retain the
appearance of control yet risk that it will be liable for a sloppy or perhaps even rogue agent’s
violations. It would be helpful for HHS to expand on its discussion in the preamble to the
Omnibus HIPAA Rule as to when a CE or upstream BA would remain liable for the violations of
an agent that disregards the principal’s instructions or otherwise violates the BAA.
Moreover, given the technical complexities of cloud computing, it would be valuable for
HHS to focus more attention on regulating cloud providers more directly. The nascent auditing
of BAs discussed elsewhere in this paper may provide one model. HHS also ought to clarify to
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what extent agency liability applies in the cloud computing context. The preamble emphasizes
that agency liability is a fact sensitive inquiry that depends on the type of service and skill level
required to perform the service. 273 HHS expressed its doubt, for example, that a small provider
would have sufficient expertise to supervise and direct a company hired to de-identify PHI. 274 It
is unclear how this analysis applies in the cloud computing context. It is possible that at least
some cloud computing services require expertise CEs and upstream BAs lack such that the cloud
service provider is not the agent of the CE or BA. But this analysis depends on the particular
service the cloud service provider is performing as well as the skill set and expertise of the CE or
upstream BA. In addition, since a CE or BA does not need to retain the right or authority to
control every aspect of a downstream BA’s activities to create agency liability, 275 perhaps HHS
will take the position that, despite cloud expertise, CEs and BAs can and should supervise
downstream cloud BAs at least with respect to risk management and HIPAA compliance. CEs
and BAs would benefit from additional guidance from HHS regarding whether cloud service
providers are or can be agents of CEs or upstream BAs despite potential gaps in technical
sophistication.
To the extent agency liability applies to cloud service provider relationships, HHS could
study the feasibility of creating a limited safe harbor for CEs and upstream BAs who engage in
guidance and vetting of downstream BAs. Recognizing that HHS recently omitted from the
Omnibus HIPAA Rule a previous exception to agency liability for CEs, 276 this limited safe
harbor could not be an end run around agency liability. Rather, a limited safe harbor would need
to go beyond the elements of the liability exception HHS rejected. For example, in addition to
complying with the pertinent BAA and HIPAA requirements and not being aware of a pattern or
practice of the BA violating the contract, CEs and upstream BAs would need to actively engage
in evaluating, educating, monitoring, and providing feedback to downstream BAs with the goal
of raising awareness of and sensitivity to the need to protect PHI. A number of the security
provisions itemized in Section IV.A above could facilitate the vetting and monitoring HHS wants
to encourage, such as requiring an SSAE 16 SOC, Type II audit and access to the cloud vendor’s
security officer for technical level discussions about its security practices. 277 To encourage due
273
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•
•
•
•

What security measures are in place to protect the data center against
unauthorized physical intrusion?
Who would be permitted to access my data and under what circumstances?
What are your procedures for terminating access to data or systems upon
termination of an employee, or upon change of job duties?
What are the processes to ensure that default passwords are changed and/or
other access controls are implemented?
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diligence and vigilance, HHS could distinguish supervising from exercising control. Thus,
guidance could clarify that being more aware of how a cloud vendor approaches security and
confirming that it has a clean audit before engaging in business with that vendor, for example, as
distinguished from retaining control to direct vendor actions on a day-to-day basis, will not
create agency liability.
Alternatively, in determining how to exercise its discretion both to bring enforcement
actions and to set penalties, HHS could issue guidance clarifying that it will take into
consideration the relative bargaining power of the parties and the extent to which CEs or
upstream BAs took steps to assess risks and take appropriate steps to preserve PHI. For
example, HHS could affirm the value of CEs and upstream BAs vetting potential vendors prior
to contracting to evaluate their qualifications and compliance with HIPAA; using a BAA that
includes all terms required by HHS; actively monitoring the agent’s performance; providing
appropriate and ongoing training and instruction to cloud service providers; and responding to
signals of possible violations. 278

•
•
•
•
•
•

What procedures exist to ensure configurations are properly set?
What does your testing/patch process include?
What is your encryption policy?
How do you secure transmissions outside your network?
Where will the data be stored? In the United States or other countries?
Does the cloud provider:
o Have cyber-insurance?
o Have an audit certification of their information security program in
compliance with the Statement on Standards for Attestation
Engagements (SSAE) No. 16 Service Organization Control (SOC)
2 or 3, or equivalent audit (e.g. ISO 27001/2)?
o Conduct (at a minimum) quarterly vulnerability scans and annual
network penetration tests?
o Use security monitoring and event log management to ensure the
collection and secure storage of audit trails?
o Review event logs periodically for anomalies?
o Document changes following industry standard practices for
configuration management and change control?
o Employ redundant hardware components, load-balanced Internet
connections with multiple service providers, and functioning
firewalls?
o Implement backup options and encrypt any removable or portable
backup media?
o Conduct business continuity and disaster recovery exercises on a
regular, planned basis?

Markey & Marchak, supra note 7, at 22-24.
278
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C.

Increasing Patient Empowerment: From Transparency to Intelligibility to
Accountability

Expanding access to personal information is part of a larger movement to hold corporate
actors accountable in an era of rapidly declining data storage costs. Asked about privacy
practices, Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt once said, “[W]e like to get right up to the creepy
line, but not cross it.” 279 But it would probably be more accurate to say that he and other
corporate leaders don’t want to be caught crossing the creepy line. Law and technology provide
a rich variety of tactics to avoid that possibility. Accountings of disclosures should provide a
persistent record of data use that should deter at least some privacy violations. 280
Many aspects of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule are aimed at assuring that patients are able to
understand (and control some) aspects of the data kept about them by CEs and BAs. While the
Rule makes several steps in the right direction, it does not reflect a full appreciation of the levels
of complexity in data flows occasioned by technological advance. Standards and best practices
still need to be adopted by the larger cloud computing community to assure optimal realization
of these rights. For example, how well can records interact with visualizations like Collusion or
The Data Map? 281 Fuller interoperability and more open API’s will be necessary in order to
empower consumers to fully understand how data flows, and how those flows influence their
opportunities.
Nor did Congress adequately appreciate, in HITECH, the degree to which big data
companies’ use of health-inflected data could eventually render HIPAA irrelevant by fueling the
creation of medical reputations unmoored from covered medical records. In order to address
these 21st century challenges to health privacy, policymakers should take two steps: rendering
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existing data about information practices more intelligible to consumers, and presenting in plain
terms to Congress the types of privacy challenges enabled by the deployment of big data.
Over a decade ago, Bill Sage complained that both supporters and critics of informationbased regulation in healthcare “have overlooked serious operational issues and misunderstood
some of the best uses of information.” 282 Sage argued that disclosure must be “properly
designed and implemented” to improve outcomes, and he worried that the disclosure movement
of the 1990’s was ill-equipped to provide actionable information to patients and providers. 283
Sage’s concerns appear especially relevant in the realm of health privacy, where the proliferation
of entities with some interest in and access to health records is far outpacing the ability of
conventional notices and written descriptions to convey information to patients.
As HHS continues clarifying the implications of the Omnibus HIPAA Rule, it should
focus on moving from transparency to intelligibility in health data. Rather than merely opening
up presently maintained information, policymakers need to focus on promoting the types of
standards and analysis that can make that data actionable. This will require careful collaboration
between regulators, technical experts, and data visualization and design experts who have studied
optimal communication strategies.
The President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) warned in
2010 against health information technology adoption uninspired by a vision for data use and
sharing that would allow healthcare to enjoy the quality and efficiency gains characteristic of
information industries. 284 It is now time to take the next step and consider how high technology
approaches could also promote privacy in healthcare. In this respect, the Federal Trade
Commission, often seen as the lead privacy regulator in the U.S. (and an entity with some role in
health privacy, given its statutory authority to regulate personal health records), offers both
lessons and a cautionary tale.
Realizing how quickly the world of online data collection is moving, the FTC has taken
important steps to monitor evolving business practices. The agency appointed Ed Felten as
“Chief Technologist,” and has also employed highly regarded privacy experts like Paul Ohm and
Christopher Soghoian. Soghoian and Felten have extensive experience in computer science; Ohm
combines computer science training with legal expertise. Each of these individuals has done a
great deal to help the agency apply expertise to current problems in privacy. Moreover, the
agency’s report, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations
for Businesses and Policymakers, was a model of sensitive appreciation of stakeholder concerns,
leading to guidance on some best practices for digital companies.
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This perceptive, well-written report grappled with fundamental issues in the law of fair
data practices and consumer protection. Where the law was plainly inadequate, the report said so.
For example, it supported "legislation that would provide consumers with access to information
held by data brokers," an increasingly important priority in a pervasively scored society. 285 The
FTC’s December 2012 subpoena of leading data brokers indicates an interest in illuminating
some of the darker corners of data collection, analysis, sharing, and use. The FTC’s commitment
to technical personnel and cutting edge reports is something of a model for other agencies tasked
with protecting privacy in an era of rapid change.
Nevertheless, there are also faults in the FTC’s approach. Peter Maass’s investigative
report for ProPublica called the agency hopelessly outmatched in terms of staffing, vis-à-vis the
extraordinary proliferation of data-driven business models it is ostensibly policing. 286 Echoing
the 1968 Nader Report on the FTC, Maass described the near-heroic (but ultimately doomed)
efforts of a chronically underfunded entity to keep up with privacy threats in the new economy.
Sadly, top officials at the agency were more defensive than supportive of Maass’s
characterization of the impossible task Congress had set for them, given the resources allocated
to it. Where its technical capacity is clearly lacking, it should say so. And it should not be afraid
to ask Congress for the resources it needs to detect lawbreaking. This might include a selffunding agency model, like the Patent and Trademark Office, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, or the FDIC. 287 Or it could ask for authorization to hire contractors to discover
wrongdoing, paying them on a contingency basis. All of these approaches should be considered
by agencies tasked with protecting health privacy, lest their mission shrink to fit whatever
inadequate resources happen to be allocated to them in any particular budget cycle.
V.

Conclusion

There are multiple uses (and misuses) of health information compiled about patients,
insureds, research subjects, physicians, hospitals, and populations. Privacy law has focused on
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assuring the confidentiality, security, and accuracy of health information. The post-HITECH
landscape will increasingly balance these concerns with the goals of innovation, access, and costcontrol.
A new body of law—health information law—is becoming a distinctive field. Just as
intellectual property (IP) law adapted property law principles to new economic phenomena, and
privacy law extended tort and contract law principles into the intangible realm of reputation, now
health information law is emerging to combine IP, privacy, and administrative principles in the
high-stakes healthcare context.
Advanced information technology has raised a number of new questions. Beyond
HIPAA and HITECH regulation, consumer protection law plays an important role in these
fields. Patients are opting to personalize their health records with the help of cloud computing
firms; what law governs this digital migration? There is increasing concern about the role of
“incidental findings” in medical research; how will regulators and professional groups address
them? When employers demand access to employee health records, in what ways can they use
them to profile the employee? Should law limit the development of “medical reputations” about
individuals, even if they are not based on protected health records? What are the proper
tradeoffs between data privacy, security, portability, integrity, and accuracy?
The networked health IT of cloud computing will raise all these questions and more as it
attempts to bring the productivity gains characteristic of information industries to healthcare.
But its systems need to be designed to protect the integrity and security of protected health
information.
The laws governing the management of healthcare information are extremely complex.
Some of this complexity is necessary to the subject matter. However, it should not obscure the
larger goals of health information law. This white paper has recommended some steps forward
to assure that the interests of patients are front and center as health data collection enters a new
and qualitatively different era of promise and peril. Both covered entities and their cloud service
providers should be held to high standards by technologies of compliance as precise and
persistent as the practices they aim to monitor and improve. If medical reputations are being
created with data outside the bounds of present HIPAA and HITECH regulation, HHS needs to
study these processes and acknowledge the limits of present models of privacy protection.
Finally, regulation needs to assure that responsibility for protecting the privacy and security of
data rests with the correct entity, be it a covered entity or business associate. The Omnibus
HIPAA Rule released in January 2013 is a major step forward for health privacy, but more work
remains to be done to assure a regulatory framework up to the challenges generated for privacy
and security generated by cloud computing technologies.
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